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Abstract 
Using demographic multi-state methods, this paper presents projections for the 
population of 120 countries (covering 93 percent of the world population in 2000) by 
age, sex and level of educational attainment for the years 2000 to 2050. The dataset 
produced gives the full educational attainment distributions for four categories (no 
education, primary, secondary and tertiary education) by five-year age groups, with 
definitions that are consistent with a previous reconstruction of educational attainment 
for the years 1970 to 2000. Based on empirical distributions of educational attainment 
by age and sex for the year 2000, the method moves along cohort lines while taking into 
account differentials in fertility and mortality by education level. The most extensive in 
time and geographical coverage to date, to our knowledge this work represents the first 
attempt to project future educational attainment trends based on a statistical model of 
historical international attainment growth. The resulting dataset provides valuable 
insights both on the feasibility of international education targets and on their 
implications for human capital and population size and age structure. 
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Projection of Populations by Level of Educational Attainment, 
Age and Sex for 120 Countries for 2005-2050 
Samir KC, Bilal Barakat, Anne Goujon, Vegard Skirbekk, Wolfgang Lutz 
Introduction 
This report is part of an ambitious, multiphase project whose aims include the 
production of a new national level dataset on educational attainment by age and sex for 
as many countries in the world as possible over the period 1970-2000, the analysis of 
these new data, the preparation of projections of educational attainment by age and sex 
for those countries through 2050, and the assessment of the likely effects of future 
changes in educational structure. The project is a joint effort of the World Population 
Program at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and the 
Vienna Institute of Demography (VID). Version 1.0 of both the educational attainment 
reconstructions and projections is now complete. In this paper we describe the methods 
used for projecting the educational attainment distributions for 120 countries for the 
years 2000-2050 using the methods of multi-state demographic modeling. 
Education-specific population projections are important both because the 
information they produce is of intrinsic and practical interest, and because taking 
education into account improves the accuracy of the population projection itself. The 
latter is true because all three fundamental demographic components of fertility, 
mortality, and migration, are strongly affected by education. In most societies, fertility 
levels vary significantly between females at different education levels (Jejeebhoy 1995; 
Bledsoe et al. 1999). Not just the number of children, but also the timing of births and 
marriage are strongly influenced by education levels. With regard to mortality, many 
factors contribute to a general pattern of higher life expectancy among the more 
education (for instance, Kitagawa and Hauser 1973; Ahlburg et al. 1996; Alachkar and 
Serow 1988; Preston and Taubman 1994; Doblhammer 1997; Lleras-Muney 2005), 
relating to healthy behavior (Kenkel 1991; Lantz et al. 1998), the gathering and 
appreciation of medical information (Niederdeppe 2008), better access to health care 
(Cleland and van Ginneken 1988), higher urbanization, etc. Finally, the highly educated 
are more likely to migrate, move greater distances, and are less likely to return to their 
country of origin. 
As a result, population projections may lead to substantively different results in 
the presence of education variables than in their absence. Without education they may 
also be less useful than they could be otherwise. Education is one of the keys to 
development. Interactions have been demonstrated with most development dimensions, 
including human rights, health, democracy, culture, economic growth, etc. (Sen 1999; 
Collier and Hoeffler 2000). Conversely, educational processes are affected by all of the 
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above. Health affects absenteeism. The government’s respect for human rights 
influences access to schools for minorities, as typically one of the largest items of public 
spending, it is tied closely to the economic development of the country. As such, 
education is both a means and an end to development. 
Accordingly, an understanding of the educational level of the population is 
important in order to speculate about future development trajectories. Recently, we 
prepared a database for the population subdivided by age, sex and education for the 
period 1970-2000 (Lutz et al. 2007). Using the UN’s age and sex distribution for the 
period, education proportions for each age group and sex were reconstructed from the 
data on the education distribution in and around 2000 (United Nations 2005). The 
dataset has been in use by many researchers in different fields analyzing effects of 
education on different variables. Applying their insights to the education profiles of 
future populations, it becomes possible to engage in informed speculation on the 
opportunities for development over the next four decades in various regions of the 
world. 
Since the effects of educational attainment can also be expected to differ by age 
(e.g., one might expect that the education of 25-34 year olds should be more important 
for economic growth than that of persons beyond retirement age) as well as by sex, 
having full age details for men and women can be considered a great asset for a 
comprehensive projection of future economic growth prospects. In the past, such 
projections by age, sex and level of education have not been available for a large set of 
countries, including both industrialized and developing countries and over several 
decades of time (but see the section on existing projections for a discussion of the 
closest alternative), although some partial efforts at projecting levels of educational 
attainment have been developed at a more aggregated level. 
This projection exercise focuses strictly on levels of educational attainment, 
which are measures of the quantity and formal level of schooling received. Educational 
quality also has an important effect on human capital. Standard measures of skills 
acquired such as the PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) or PIRLS 
(Progress in International Reading Literacy Study) school performance databases or 
IALS (International Adult Literacy Survey) for adults are based on actual testing of 
samples of the population and show strong variation between countries that could 
explain other differentials associated with education. However, such datasets based on 
direct testing of skills are so far only available for a small number of (mostly OECD) 
countries, but efforts are underway (e.g., by the UNESCO Institute of Statistics) to 
collect such information for a larger number of countries. In the future we plan to 
incorporate educational quality and skills assessed on the basis of testing into our 
measures for countries where data are available, but this will be done in a later phase of 
the project. 
Following this introduction, this paper has six sections: Section 2 introduces the 
basic idea of demographic multi-state projections and discusses earlier applications. 
Section 3 discusses the existing projections and how the present exercise differs. 
Section 4 contains the main body of the paper, describing our method. It begins with a 
concise summary of the different steps involved and then discusses at some length the 
key dimensions of the method: the raw data and their adjustment, the assumptions about 
fertility and mortality differentials and migration, our ways of dealing with the age at 
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progressing to higher attainment categories, the different demographic and educational 
scenarios, and current limitations that may be overcome in future revisions. Section 5 
gives a brief discussion of selected results and Section 6 presents some sensitivity 
analyses. The concluding section will give a short outlook of what kinds of studies are 
possible with these projections. 
Approach 
In this section we briefly describe the general approach taken in producing these new 
human capital projections. Starting from one empirical dataset for each country for the 
year 2000, distributions by level of education are projected along cohort lines. 
The projections are based on the demographic method of multi-state population 
projection which was developed at IIASA during the 1970s and is now a well accepted 
method among technical demographers. Our baseline year providing the empirical 
starting point is 2000, the same as in our reconstruction of the education distribution in 
the past. This allows the backward- and forward-projections to be connected in a 
gapless time series. We chose 2000 as the base year, since the data for 2005 were not 
available for a vast majority of countries. 
The basic idea of projection is straightforward: Assuming that the educational 
attainment of a person remains invariant after a certain age, we can derive, e.g., the 
proportion of women without any formal education aged 50-54 in 2005 directly from 
the proportion of women without any formal education aged 45-49 in 2000. Continuing 
to assume that this proportion is constant along cohort lines, the proportion of women 
without education aged 95-99 in 2050 for the same cohort follows directly. In a similar 
manner, the proportions for each educational category and each age group of men and 
women can simply be moved to the next older five-year age group as one moves 
forward in time in five-year steps. 
These proportions would be precisely correct if no individual moves up to the 
category with primary education after the age of 15 and if mortality and migration did 
not differ by level of education. This follows directly from the fact that the size of a 
birth cohort as it ages over time can only change through mortality and migration. 
However, strong links do in fact exist between the education level and mortality, 
fertility and migration behavior. Accordingly, the above approach is adjusted to correct 
for these effects. The size of birth cohorts is dependent on the levels of education of 
women in childbearing age, where a negative relationship is traditionally observed. In 
projecting these cohorts forward, differential survival rates are applied to the education 
groups. The differentials are based on a comprehensive literature review as well from 
modeling exercises based on past data. The details of these adjustments are provided in 
later sections. 
The above treats the different education groups essentially as separate sub-
populations. In addition, at younger years transitions between the education categories 
may occur. These are described in detail in later sections. The analysis is simplified by 
the assumption that changes in educational attainment are uni-directional, in other 
words, individuals can only move from the ‘no education’ status to primary, and on to 
secondary and possibly to tertiary, but never revert to a lower status. 
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In reality, the likelihood of an individual making the transition from one 
educational attainment level to the next highest is strongly dependent on the education 
of the parents. This educational inheritance mechanism is not, however, modeled 
explicitly here. Instead, the assumptions regarding the transition rates and their future 
development are statistically derived from the aggregate behavior of education systems 
in the past. Since this expansion is partly the result of the inheritance mechanism, i.e., 
the fact that many parents aspire for their children to reach an education level at least as 
high as they themselves did, inheritance is implicitly reflected in the projection even 
though it is not formally part of the model. Such an approach appears preferable at this 
time, because data on the aggregate growth patterns of education systems, on which 
assumptions for the future can be based, are much more readily available than robust 
data on the micro-process of educational inheritance. 
The starting point for the projection is data collected for each country (typically 
around the year 2000) which gives the total population by sex, five-year age groups and 
four attainment categories based on the current International Standard Classification of 
Education (ISCED 1997): no education, primary, secondary and tertiary (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1.  Education categories. 
Category Definition 
No education No formal education or less than one year primary 
Primary Uncompleted primary, completed primary (ISCED 1), and 
uncompleted lower secondary 
Secondary Completed lower secondary (ISCED 2), uncompleted and 
completed higher secondary (ISCED 3/4), and uncompleted tertiary 
education 
Tertiary Completed tertiary education (ISCED 5/6) 
 
 
A single set of categories applied to all countries regardless of their state of 
educational development inevitably requires some compromises to be made. Surveys 
used exclusively in developing countries have historically provided little differentiation 
at higher education levels. Conversely, data collected in industrialized countries may 
not differentiate below completed primary level. For present purposes, the entire 
spectrum from no education to completed tertiary needs to be covered. At the same 
time, a large number of detailed categories would be unwieldy and limit the number of 
countries for which data are available. Consequently, a relatively small number of 
categories is used to cover the entire spectrum. This means that the categories are 
relatively broad. Note, for instance, that ‘primary’ does not refer to completed primary, 
but to having more than one year of primary schooling. Likewise, for the purposes of 
this study, ‘secondary’ refers to lower secondary, not completed upper secondary. 
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Our procedure for each country can be summarized as follows:  • A baseline population distribution by five-year age group, sex, and level of 
educational attainment is derived for the year 2000. • For each five-year time step, cohorts move to the next highest five-year age 
group. • Mortality rates are applied, specific to each age, sex, and education group, and to 
each period. • Age, and sex-specific educational transition rates are applied. • Age, sex, and education-specific net-migrants are added to or removed from the 
population. • Fertility rates are applied, specific to each age, sex, and education group, and to 
each period, to determine the size of the new 0-5 age group. • The new population distribution by age, sex, and level of educational attainment 
is noted, and the above steps repeated for the next five-year time step. 
The aim of the projection is to obtain a dataset with the population distributed by 
five-year age groups, starting at age 15 and with the highest age group 100+, by sex, 
and by four levels of educational attainment over a period of 50 years from 2000 (base 
year) to 2050 in five-year intervals. 
To illustrate the kind of information that this projection method generates for 
120 countries in the world, Figure 1 gives an example in terms of age pyramids by level 
of education for South Africa. The first pyramid (Fig. 1a) shows the structure by age, 
sex and level of education for the year 2000, which is the empirical baseline information 
used for the reconstruction. The second pyramid (Fig. 1b) gives the projected structure 
for the year 2050, resulting from our method. 
 
South Africa - Population by Age, Sex and Educational Attainment in 2000 - Global Education 
Trend - Scenario
3000 2000 1000 0 1000 2000 3000
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20-24
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30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
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No Education 
Primary 
Secondary 
Tertiary
 
Figure 1a.  Structure by age, sex and level of education for South Africa for the year 
2000. 
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South Africa - Population by Age, Sex and Educational Attainment in 2050 - Global Education 
Trend - Scenario
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Figure 1b.  Projected structure for South Africa for the year 2050. 
Existing Projections 
Whereas the increasing awareness of the importance of human capital in economic 
growth and development has stimulated several attempts to estimate the past 
educational composition of the population, few attempts have been made to actually 
project future levels of education. Ahuja and Filmer (1995) project educational 
attainment for 71 developing counties and four education categories by superimposing 
on existing United Nations population projections an educational distribution estimated 
for two broad age groups (6–24 and 25+). Their approach is that of the perpetual 
inventory method, where long time series of total school enrollment are translated into 
estimates of educational attainment of the adult population. On top of the problems 
inherent to the quality of enrollment indicators, long time series are rarely available and 
this method involves numerous assumptions to construct those time series. The 
European Commission has applied a modified perpetual inventory methodology to 
project the levels of educational attainment based on projections of the average years of 
schooling by age groups following a cohort approach (European Commission 2003, 
2004) and the translation of enrollment rates into levels of educational attainment. The 
projections are carried out for the EU-15 countries and for both sexes. They show that 
for some countries, the scope for improvements are rather small as younger cohorts are 
almost as educated as older ones (like Germany), whereas in other countries (Spain) the 
scope for improvements is broader. 
The multi-state approach, the base for the present projections, was developed at 
IIASA by Andrei Rogers (Rogers 1975) and was applied by a group of IIASA 
researchers to human capital projections in a study of future development options, so-
called Population Development Environment (PDE) studies, first in Mauritius. (Lutz 
1994), and then in Cape Verde (Wils 1996), the Yucatan Peninsula (Lutz et al. 2000), 
Botswana (Sanderson et al. 2001b), Namibia (Sanderson et al. 2001a), and Mozambique 
(Wils et al. 2001). Independently from those PDE studies, Yousif et al. (1996) applied 
this methodology to project the population of six North African countries by age, sex, 
and education. Further case studies include projections for India at the state level 
(Goujon and McNay 2003), for some countries in the Arab region (Goujon 2002), for 
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China by urban and rural areas (Cao 2000), for Southeast Asia (Goujon and KC 2006), 
and for Egyptian governorates (Goujon et al. 2007). Several publications have aimed at 
evaluating this approach such as Lutz et al. (1999) and more recently Lutz et al. (2008). 
The method has been applied to produce the first global level (for 13 world regions) 
projections by age, sex, and educational attainment to 2030 by Lutz and Goujon (2001). 
The closest approach to the IIASA human capital projections is that of the 
Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) whose human capital model (EDPOP) was 
developed by Annababette Wils, a former IIASA researcher. In 2007, they produced 
projections for 83 developing countries and 3 education categories to 2025 based on the 
extrapolation of country-specific trajectories (Wils 2007). The EPDC developed a tool 
for education projections that promises greater accuracy in the short-term by explicitly 
modeling school and enrollment dynamics in terms of empirical and country-specific 
student flows (progression, repetition and dropout rates). The EPDC model also 
includes a feedback mechanism between parents’ education and the educational 
attainment of children that the present version of our projections lacks. However, the 
enrollment-based methodology makes it difficult to scale up the time frame much 
beyond a full education cycle of 10-15 years. In addition, the great demands on country 
data limit the possibility of including a large majority of countries. Models to project 
school enrollment and the resources required for the projected pupils have also been 
developed at national levels by government ministries, as well as international agencies 
such as UNESCO and the World Bank to help the planning process and have been 
particularly useful as negotiation tools. The models end when pupils graduate; therefore, 
they have not been used to project the impact of changing enrollment on human capital. 
By comparison, the current version of our projections focuses on education 
scenarios of a convergence to global trends (defined below), rather than on an 
extrapolation of country-specific trajectories. While less accurate with respect to 
individual countries in the short-term, this allows greater coverage in the geographical 
and time dimensions, allowing broader conclusions about the global implications of 
changes in human capital. It may be argued that the EPDC approach is more suited to 
forecasting, while the present approach is more flexible with regard to engaging in 
‘what if’ scenario reasoning regarding future global economic growth or health 
prospects. 
Methodology 
Raw Data and Adjustments 
What is required as a baseline for the projections are population distributions by age, 
sex, and level of educational attainment for all countries to be included in the study. No 
single source of data provides this, so an integration of a diverse range of datasets was 
required. The baseline year 2000 was chosen partly because data for or around the year 
2005 was not yet available for all countries at the time of data collection. 
Various adjustments were necessary to create the integrated year 2000 baseline 
dataset. These included adjustments for data from other years in the interval 1998-2002, 
and the standardization of education categories, the mapping of data on 10-year age 
groups to our five-year age groups, the mapping of different aggregate ‘old age’ 
categories (60+ versus 65+ for instance) and other minor corrections. Details of these 
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adjustments, as well as the list of data sources, are documented in the report on the 
back-projection exercise (Lutz et al. 2007) and the validation exercises (Riosmena et al. 
2008), with which the present projection shares the baseline dataset. Using this 
procedure, the starting populations by age, sex and four levels of attainment for the year 
2000 were obtained for 120 countries. 
Educational Fertility Differentials 
Female education has long been identified as one of the most powerful determinants of 
fertility at the individual level. Exceptions exist, but in the overwhelming majority of 
settings, women with more schooling initiate childbearing later and have fewer children 
at the end of the reproductive period (Abou-Gamrah 1982; Chaudhury 1984; Cleland 
2002; Huq and Cleland 1990; Jones 1982; Khalifa 1976; Malawi National Statistical 
Office 1993; Smits et al. 2000; United Nations 1995). This relationship has been 
observed in countries at all stages of development and from a wide range of cultural 
traditions. Several interrelated behavioral, economic, institutional and social factors are 
likely to be at work. Education can affect preferences for fertility timing and outcomes, 
raise female autonomy, increase contraceptive use and raise the opportunity costs of 
childbearing (Goldin and Katz 2002; Jejeebhoy 1995; Skirbekk et al. 2004; Westoff and 
Ryder 1977). 
The fertility impact of women’s schooling can be highly context-specific, 
varying by region of the world, level of development and time (Jejeebhoy 1995). It may 
also be affected by cultural conditions, particularly by the position women occupy in a 
traditional kinship structure. Jejeebhoy also suggests that education affects fertility in a 
non-linear fashion, where some schooling would lead to somewhat higher education, 
but additional schooling would lower it. Skirbekk (2008), however, tests this 
relationship based on 506 samples, and finds that schooling generally does lowers 
fertility, also at the intermediary levels. 
Jain (1981) and Gustavsson (2006) suggest that the labor market situation can 
explain the magnitude of the schooling-fertility relationship. Education is more 
negatively related to fertility, the more opportunity costs increase with schooling, as is 
the case when employment and income correlates with educational levels. Moreover, a 
perceived negative relationship between children’s education and status and the number 
of children, the ‘quality versus quantity’ of offspring, could decrease fertility outcomes 
(Angrist et al. 2006; Becker 1991). The very low fertility levels of highly educated 
women in countries characterized by below replacement fertility is not likely to be 
intentional. Highly educated women have high, and according to some evidence higher, 
fertility ideals than others – it is realized fertility that is low (Noack and Lyngstad 2000; 
Symeonidou 2000; Testa and Grilli 2006; Van Peer 2002). 
Demographic behavior in early adulthood has been characterized by a very 
typical sequence in which the completion of education is followed first by entry into the 
labor market and then by the birth of the first child (Marini 1984; Corijn 1996). 
Moreover, the global extension of education in recent decades has shifted the onset of 
this sequence to increasingly older ages. Consistent with this argument, Blossfeld and 
Huinink (1991) show that few women have children during their time in education. 
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In developing countries, education has a stronger fertility reducing effect than in 
developed countries. For those with little or no education, children will more likely 
represent net benefits and social security even in a relatively short term – especially 
when the children work from an early age and receive low health and education 
investments (Caldwell 1982; Cochrane 1979). A rapid mortality decline may imply that 
many will miscalculate the number of children who will survive to adulthood – and lead 
to higher fertility among those with less schooling (Cleland 2001; Heer 1983). The low 
educated are likely to be laggards in the fertility transition and educational fertility 
differences may be indicative of a late fertility decline (Casterline 2001; Kravdal 2002). 
The level of education is generally lower in developing countries, and increasing 
schooling from low levels rather than from medium levels can have stronger fertility 
reducing implications (Cochrane 1979; United Nations 1995). Lower education can be 
associated with less knowledge about reproduction and lower access to contraception. 
Those with lower education are also likely to be less urbanized, have more traditional 
gender views and to believe social status is increased by higher fertility (Birdsall and 
Griffin 1988; Cochrane 1979; Jejeebhoy 1995). Adherence to religious leaders and the 
belief that religiosity requires high fertility or prohibits contraceptive use have also been 
found to be stronger among the less educated (Avong 2001; McQuillan 2004). 
Education is likely to have a causal effect on both the timing and the outcome of 
fertility; however, its magnitude depends on the socio-economic and cultural setting. 
Skirbekk (2008) finds that women’s fertility is on average significantly lower for the 
more educated – around 30 percent lower comparing the highest to the least educated 
group – and more so in poorer, high fertility contexts. The negative effect is stronger for 
Asia, Africa, Middle East and Latin America than for Europe and North America. 
Relative fertility differentials by education persist for countries at the end of the fertility 
transition, albeit of somewhat smaller magnitude. 
In explanations of the timing and level of fertility in developed countries, the 
role of education and human capital investments has often been emphasized. Despite the 
emphasis on the role of education in postponing and depressing fertility, only a few 
studies have identified the causal effects of the ‘age at school graduation’ on fertility 
patterns. Comparing individuals across educational attainment invokes selection 
problems, as individuals with more education also differ in terms of their preferences, 
abilities, labor market opportunities and other factors relevant to the timing and 
outcome of fertility. Standard analyses of the relationship between education and 
fertility that compare individuals with different educational attainment are therefore 
likely to be distorted, as many unobserved characteristics associated with higher 
graduation ages tend to be poorly measured or omitted. Analyses that overcome the 
above problem frequently rely on instrumental variable techniques, fixed-effect models, 
or ‘natural experiments’ (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 2000). 
Several econometric approaches have been used to overcome the endogeneity 
problems associated with analyses of education and fertility behavior (e.g., Rodgers et 
al. forthcoming, who study the relation between cognitive ability, education and fertility 
timing). Kravdal and Rindfuss (2007) and Bloemen and Kalwij (2001) attempt the use 
of detailed data and simultaneous modeling to disentangle the impact of schooling from 
other factors on childbearing patterns. Often, these studies rely on strong assumptions to 
identify any “causal influences” of education on fertility and human capital. 
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While the exact causal mechanism of the education-fertility link remains 
unclear, and may well differ in different settings, there is a strong case for modeling the 
resulting differentials in outcome. In the projection model, the above fertility 
differentials were modeled as fixed relative ratios between the Total Fertility Rates 
(TFR) of different education groups. 
A database of the relative differences in TFR for each country was prepared 
from a wide variety of data sources, including Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), 
World Fertility Surveys (WFS), Reproductive Health Surveys (RHS), World Values 
Surveys (WVS), national censuses and International Public Use Micro-Sample 
(IPUMS) census data. Overall, around 100 countries were represented from all major 
regions and levels of development. The education categories were matched as closely as 
possible to those used in the projection. Fertility data referred either to TFR or 
completed cohort fertility for an age group above the age of 40 (or 35 if no higher age 
was available). Because of these differences in indicator, and also in terms of the time 
period the data refer to, fertility differences were extracted from this database in the 
form of relative ratios (RR) of the education-specific TFR (ESTFR) rather than absolute 
values. Typical values range from a 10 percent or lower fertility penalty of the highest 
compared to the lowest education group in some Nordic countries to 50 percent or more 
in many developing countries. 
Imputations were performed in some cases where the data was missing fully or 
partially. Values from neighboring closely identical or from other close education 
groups were used for the imputation. 
Given the RR-ESTFR, ESTFR can be derived from a country’s overall TFR 
(obtained from the UN projection). However, ultimately fertility rates are required for 
purposes of the projection that are not only country- and education-, but at the same 
time age-specific. Since these exact rates are rarely available, and such a large number 
of parameters cannot be estimated directly from the available empirical data, a number 
of structural assumptions are required. A parametric model is assumed to describe the 
relative age-specific fertility rates (ASFR). If this model can be reduced to depend only 
on a single parameter related to the overall level of fertility, it can be used for any given 
country to derive education-specific ASFRs (ESASFR) from the ESTFR obtained 
above. 
The parametric model was derived as follows, in analogy to Booth (1984). The 
idea is to specify ASFRs relative to a reference distribution. This reference ASFR was 
based on data from the UN’s 2006 world population projections (United Nations 2007) 
for 193 countries in the year 1995-2000. We chose this period as these data are less 
recent and hence less likely to undergo further revision than data from 2000-2005. 
Following a suitable (empirically determined) transformation t(x) of the age-
axis, the reference, or ‘standard’, cumulative ASFR can be described by a Gompertz 
function. This is an s-shaped function similar to a logistic function, but differs from the 
latter on account of being asymmetrical, with faster initial growth and slower saturation. 
From this point on, ‘age’ is taken to refer to transformed age as above. The ‘Gompit’ is 
defined as  
. 
Let F(x) be the cumulative relative ASFR at age x, i.e., 
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. 
Let Ys(x) equal Gompit(Fs(x)) of the above standard fertility schedule. Then a new 
ASFR schedule Y(x) can be defined in terms of Ys(x) as  
    (1) 
A cumulative ASFR schedule may be recovered from Y(x) by reversing the above 
transformations. Intercept α indicates the start of childbearing with α < 0 indicating that 
fertility starts later than in the standard and α indicating that fertility starts earlier. Slope 
β =1 means the spread is same as in standard; β < 1 indicates a wider spread (natural 
fertility) and β > 1 a narrow spread. 
Next, for each country we estimated α and β using Eq. (1). The number of 
parameters can be further reduced. The first step is to relate β to the TFR. Based on 
maximum R-square, we found a Power fit was best with the following results for β: 
   (2) 
 
All fits for α have very low values for R2. Hence, for given TFR α cannot be reliably 
estimated. The above serves to derive ESASFRs from ESTFRs. For a specific country, 
    (3) 
For each education group represented by subscript i, 
    (4) 
From Eqs. (3) and (4), eliminating Ys(x) and rearranging we get the following 
equation: 
   (5) 
Now, Y(x), α0, β0 and βi are estimated from Eqs. (2) and (3). Regarding αi, it is 
well established that the age of the mother at first birth is later among women with a 
higher level of education. Therefore we set  
     (6) 
where di represents the difference in alpha between the base educational category and i 
education category. We assume the values of di (with no education as base group) to be 
0, -0.1, -0.25, -0.50. These values were experimentally derived, by adjusting the factors 
until the shapes of the implied ESASFR plausibly reflected typical postponement 
patterns. 
Using Eq. (5), country ESTFRs can be transformed into country-specific 
ESASFRs as required for the projection. The country TFR implied by the ESTFR 
corresponds to the average ESTFR, weighted by size of the education group. The 
ESTFR can be chosen to satisfy both the constraints on their relative ratios and the 
condition that the implied TFR match the actual country TFR. However, ideally the 
country’s whole ASFR should remain intact. In other words, at each age the weighted 
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average of the ESASFR should match the ASFR. An exact match of all ASFR cannot be 
guaranteed at the same time. 
An iterative procedure is performed starting with the ESTFR for the secondary 
group equal to the population TFR. This ESTFR for secondary is changed during the 
iterative procedure until the difference in the age-specific births between the UN 
projection and our procedure is minimal. More precisely, the sum across age groups of 
the squared error in age-specific births was minimized. Any difference remaining was 
adjusted proportionally. 
Visual inspection of the graphs of the resulting ESASFR suggests that these are 
plausible for most countries except in few countries with either extremely high fertility 
(such as Niger or Uganda) or in countries with extremely low fertility (Macao) and in 
Mongolia. 
Procedure (2000-2005): 
1 TFR for 2000-2005 from UN. 
2 ASFR for 2000-2005 from UN. 
3 Country-specific relative ratio of ESTFRs derived/imputed from various 
sources. 
4 The level of country-specific ESTFRs that is consistent with the overall TFR 
and ASFR is not known as it depends on both education distribution and age 
distribution. We start by anchoring the TFR of the secondary education group to 
the overall TFR. 
5 ESTFR calculated using relative ratio of ESTFR. (1, 3-4). 
6 For each education group, the relative ratios of ESASFRs are derived from the 
Gompertz Relational Logit as explained above. 
7 The ESTFRs (from step 5) are distributed using the relative ratio of ESASFR 
pattern of 2000-2005 (from step 6). 
8 Mid-year populations for 2000-2005 estimated from projection (using mortality 
and migration components). 
9 The number of AS-ES-births are calculated and aggregated over educational 
levels (7-8). 
10 The number of births by age using overall ASFR for 2000-2005 is calculated. (2, 
8). 
11 The difference between the aggregated (step 9) and overall births (step 10) for 
each age group is calculated. (9-10). 
12 The differences were squared and summed across the age groups. (11). 
13 The goal is to minimize this sum by changing the value of TFR (anchored in 
secondary). 
14 The final values are the ESASFR to be used as starting point for the projection. 
This procedure was repeated for all periods. 
Educational Mortality Differentials 
Demographers are aware that mortality rates differ substantially among different 
socioeconomic groups in the population (Kitagawa and Hauser 1973; Preston et al. 
1981; Pamuk 1985; Alachkar and Serow 1988; Duleep 1989; Feldman et al. 1989; Elo 
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and Preston 1996; Rogot et al. 1992; Pappas et al. 1993; Huisman et al. 2004). For the 
educational reconstruction, these mortality differentials were crucial, since the 
information being reconstructed was precisely the educational attainment profile of 
those who had died between 1970 and 2000 (those alive in 2000 were present in the 
baseline data). For the present purpose of projection, on the other hand, in particular of 
the projection of the working age population 15-60 or 15-65, mortality plays a much 
smaller role. Accordingly, this issue is discussed only briefly here, and more attention is 
paid to the question of fertility differentials, which are more important for forward 
projection. For details on the mortality component omitted here, please refer to the 
reconstruction report (Lutz et al. 2007). 
Because the direct measurement of mortality by level of education requires a 
reliable and comprehensive death registration system, together with information on the 
education of the deceased and the corresponding risk populations, such empirical data 
are limited to a few industrialized countries and are virtually absent from the developing 
world. This leaves only a sequence of censuses as a source of insight. An extensive 
exercise comparing education-specific cohort survival over three to four decennial 
censuses for eight countries from different world regions and development stages was 
carried out at IIASA in 2005 and the findings were reported in separate papers 
(Sanderson 2005; Figoli 2006; Fotso 2006; Woubalem 2006) and cannot be reported 
here in any detail. 
For several reasons we decided to parameterize the educational mortality 
differentials in terms of differences in life expectancy at age 15 (e15 in standard life-
table notation). Later educational attainment of an individual cannot causally affect 
survival in lower ages. We assumed that the effect of an individual’s education on 
mortality starts at around age 15, the age where cohorts begin to join the labor force and 
the type of job they get is somehow related to their current educational attainment at 
that age and to some extent their expected future educational attainment. 
For the countries studied, we found that with reference to the secondary 
educational category, the average difference in e15 was three years less in the no-
educational category, two years less in the primary category, and two years more in the 
tertiary category. It is interesting to note that practically all of the countries studied 
showed this pattern of a smaller differential between the lowest two categories. Also, 
this pattern of two years difference in life expectancy between the highest categories fits 
well with the general pattern of educational mortality differentials directly measured in 
some industrialized countries with complete population registers. 
Using a technique very similar to the one described above that was used to 
derive age- and education-specific fertility rates that are consistent with the age-specific 
rates provided by the UN, education-specific mortality rates were derived: 
1. We start with e15 of the population in 2000 (UN projection) and estimate e
i
15 for 
the four education categories based on the education proportions at age 15 for 
the base year. Formally, with i = 1, 2, 3 and 4 representing education categories 
E1, E2, E3 and E4, the eix were chosen to satisfy 
 
subject to 
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where the di are the empirically determined mortality differentials described 
above. This is achieved by setting 
 
2. Using a Brass-Gompertz Relational Model we estimated the relative age pattern 
of mortality for each educational attainment category based on the reference 
mortality pattern of the population as a whole. We obtained Lx for each category 
with ei15 known from the above equation. 
3. We assume that there will be no differential in mortality by education below age 
15. So below age 15 the same Lx from the UN will be used for all education 
groups. 
4. The above education-specific rates were used to calculate the number of deaths 
in each educational group (by age and sex). These numbers were then 
aggregated over attainment levels to compare with the numbers from the UN 
projection. An iterative procedure was used to optimize the anchor e115. The 
remaining discrepancies were proportionally adjusted. 
This method was repeated for every period. 
Migration Assumptions 
For each sex and period, the difference in the population distribution by age at the end 
of the period between the UN projection and our projection (aggregated over education 
categories) was calculated. Positive differences imply positive net-migration. In cases of 
negative net-migrants for any age group, the age-specific negative net-migrants are 
drawn proportionally from the education groups in the relevant age group (at the end of 
the period distribution). In the absence of detailed information on the migration flows 
between individual sending and receiving countries, the age-sex-education distribution 
of the population of sending countries was pooled for each period. 
In the case of age-specific positive net-migration, the shares from the pooled 
distribution are used to distribute the positive net-migrants to the four education 
categories. Effectively this implies first that the educational profile of migrants is 
representative of their country of origin, and second that receiving countries are on the 
whole not selective with regard to the origin or educational profile of their net 
immigrants. Neither of these assumptions is strictly plausible; however, in the absence 
of more detailed data to account for educational selectivity and flows specific to pairs of 
sending and receiving countries, the present approach seems preferable to ignoring 
migration altogether. In some cases, the assumption that the education profile of net-
immigrants to a particular country is representative of the global migrant pool would 
result in the arrival of individuals with education level Ei in a country where the 
population share of this category is close to zero. In order to moderate the 
counterintuitive implications of this assumption, the net-immigrants in age groups 
below 60 are added to the next higher non-empty education category if the share of their 
original education level is below 1 percent in the receiving population. Net-immigrants 
aged 60+ are distributed proportionally among the receiving population education 
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categories in the corresponding age group. These corrections theoretically lead to an 
upward bias in the aggregate global education distribution, but of negligible magnitude. 
Despite this correction it may happen that some industrialized receiving countries 
appear to make little progress in universalizing secondary attainment, or even to be 
regressing, as a result of the assumed arrival of merely primary-schooled migrants. 
Recent evidence suggests that with respect to highly skilled migration in 
particular, a relatively small number of receiving countries (chiefly the OECD plus a 
few other countries in the Middle East) account for the overwhelming share of 
immigration (Docquier and Marfouk 2006). At the same time, these are countries for 
which better data may most easily be available. Accordingly, migration is one area 
where future revisions of the projections may be significantly improved even in the 
absence of truly global migration data. 
Educational Progression Assumptions 
Changes in educational attainment by age and sex follow a hierarchical multi-state 
model which implies that transitions from one educational category to another can only 
go in one direction and have to follow a predefined sequence. This means that people 
over time can only move to the next higher educational attainment category step by step 
and cannot move backward. Somebody who has once reached completed tertiary 
education will maintain this status throughout his/her life no matter what happens to the 
person’s actual skills or abilities. This follows from the definition of a formal level of 
educational attainment chosen here, which is the only approach possible given the 
nature of the empirical data. Should more systematic information on actual skills by age 
become available for several points in time, one could also think of applying models 
that explicitly capture the possible deterioration of skills. 
In the case of forward projections, it is both the timing and the quantum of 
transitions that matters. Since in this projection we begin with the 15-19 age group, 
transitions that typically happen before this age need not be of concern here. This is 
clearly the case for the transition from the category no formal education (E1) to that of 
some primary education (E2). But the issue already becomes more problematic for 
transitions from primary (E2) to the completed lower secondary education (E3) and 
completed tertiary categories, where a certain proportion is expected to still happen 
between ages 15 and 19. The transitions to completed tertiary (E4) clearly can happen in 
a broad range of age groups. While the timing of transitions to E3 will only require 
some assumptions about the age group 15-19, the transitions to tertiary clearly require 
more consideration. The main problem is that the ages at transitions to E4 vary greatly 
among countries. For example, before 1997 the Bachelor’s degree in Nepal only took 
two years and many people finished at the age of 20. In contrast, in some African 
countries, it is not uncommon to receive the first university degree after the age of 40. 
For this reason we need some country-specific assumptions for the transitions to E4. 
For the transition from no education (E1) to at least some primary (E2), it is 
assumed that all transitions happen before the age of 15. For the transition to completed 
lower secondary (E3) which in most countries typically happens around the age of 14, 
the following method is applied to each country individually. The proportion of the 10-
15 age group in 2000 that will eventually transition from E2 to E3 is provided by the 
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global education trend (GET) scenario assumptions. The proportions that have already 
made the transition are known empirically from the share of E3 among the 10-15 age 
group in the baseline data. A ratio can be derived describing the proportion of 
transitions from E2 to E3 that occur before and after the age of 15. The assumed change 
in this ratio is described below. The same principle is applied to the transition from E2 
to E3, i.e., to tertiary. In this case however, the transitions are spread over three five-
year intervals, since the empirical baseline suggests that a significant proportion of first 
tertiary degrees are obtained as late as the early 30s, especially in some African 
countries. 
The timing of the transitions partly reflect particular features of national school 
systems, such as the official age of entry, the number of grades in primary and lower 
secondary school and so on. Because these differences will not necessarily persist over 
decades to come, it is assumed that the age of transition from the primary to the 
secondary category – for those who make the transition at all – will converge to age 15 
for all countries. This convergence is assumed to begin in 2010 and be completed by 
2030. Before this convergence sets in, the proportion of the primary category may 
change dramatically between the 15-19 and 20-24 age groups in countries where prior 
to 2000, lower secondary school was typically completed after the age of 15. 
It is important to note the exact definitions of the education levels as indicated in 
Table 1. In particular, the need for a relatively small number of categories that would be 
applied uniformly across countries at different stages of development means the choice 
is not optimal for, or corresponds to common usage in, either less developed or fully 
industrialized countries. In particular, the definition of ‘secondary’ as requiring only 
lower secondary means that the fact that some countries, such as New Zealand, Finland 
or Austria, report 100 percent attainment at secondary level in this sense, does not 
contradict the fact that there may be ongoing policy debates in these countries about the 
lack of universal completion of the upper secondary level. Moreover, ISCED definitions 
notwithstanding, it may well be that with reference to the educational structure of other 
comparable countries, New Zealand, Finland or Austria would be considered to have 
their share of mere primary-level attainers. 
Another limitation that needs to be taken into account affects a number of 
countries, particularly in central Europe. In these countries, including Germany, Poland, 
Slovakia, and a number of others, lower and upper secondary are not necessarily 
successive phases, but may be parallel alternatives. In other words, after primary school, 
some students may enroll in a school type that leads straight to an upper secondary 
certificate. As a result, such students will be counted as having attained only primary, 
even after having completed the number of school years that corresponds to lower 
secondary. In terms of timing, these students only enter the ‘secondary’ category at the 
age of transition to upper secondary, not lower secondary. This explains why in the 
projections for these countries an implausible share of students appears to transition to 
E2 only at the age of 18, even though E2 only requires lower secondary which is 
normally attained much earlier. 
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Scenarios 
Demographic Scenario 
A trajectory of a future fertility is always uncertain. However, this uncertainty may be 
characterized with some degree of confidence. There are two issues in creating a most 
likely trajectory of fertility: The overall level of the fertility, TFR (period or cohort), and 
the distribution of the overall level among ages. The UN, Eurostat, IIASA, the US 
Census Bureau and many other national statistical offices and independent institutes and 
individuals publish estimates of future demographic developments. Some provide a 
single baseline trajectory plus a number of variants. Others use a probabilistic approach, 
combining an extrapolation of the past with a random component of variation. In both 
types of projection methodology, a baseline scenario is typically defined, in the case of 
probabilistic projections by removing the random variation component. Hence, we will 
first establish what will be our baseline trajectory for the overall population by 
reproducing the UN projection (United Nations 2007). 
The UN Population Division regularly publishes population projections by age 
and sex for 193 countries of the world. The projections include different variants. The 
UN medium variant indicates the most likely future scenario. We obtained the 
assumptions regarding mortality, fertility and migration from the published sources, 
personal correspondence with the UN authors as well as from our own calculations (for 
the age-sex specific migration distribution). Given the UN assumptions, we introduced 
the education component with differentials in mortality, fertility and migration. We 
matched our initial projection to the UN projections by ensuring that the aggregated 
data from our projection exactly match the UN’s projection in terms of deaths, births, 
migration and therefore the population distribution. 
For 44 countries, the assumptions regarding the future development of fertility 
deviate from the UN projections, while the migration and mortality assumptions remain 
the same as for the UN scenario. Specifically, Eurostat assumptions were used for the 
EU27 excluding Luxembourg, Switzerland and Norway. For Russia, Ukraine, Croatia, 
Macedonia and Turkey, fertility projections produced at the Vienna institute of 
Demography (Scherbov et al. 2008) were followed. Finally, for China, Japan, South 
Korea, Thailand, Singapore, Macao and Hong Kong, where recent evidence suggests 
that the UN fertility assumptions may be inappropriate, fertility assumptions were 
formulated at IIASA. The UN’s ASFRs were proportionally adjusted to match the TFRs 
in these scenarios. The actual fertility parameters assumed (where these differ from the 
UN) are included in the Appendix Table. 
Education Scenarios 
No doubt making assumptions about future educational development over the course of 
several decades is a seemingly impossible task. However, it is not intrinsically more 
difficult than making assumptions about reproductive behavior or mortality. Like 
variant projections of demographic indicators, the education scenarios below are not to 
be interpreted as predictions or forecasts, but as exercises in ‘what if’ reasoning. As 
such they serve the important purpose of illustrating the consequences of different kinds 
of trends and policy environments on global human capital. In any case, the notion that 
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we can avoid making assumptions about future educational attainment trends is a 
fallacy: Since fertility is influenced by education levels, population projections 
inevitably make implicit assumptions about the population’s future educational 
attainment, even if these remain unstated. In our view, it is preferable to be explicit 
about these assumptions. 
In addition, the analyses underlying the global education trend scenario (see 
below) show that the complexity of the social dynamics of school expansion 
notwithstanding, there are indeed some robust historical trends that provide reasonable 
guides for assumptions about future expansion. 
Constant enrollment number (CEN) scenario 
In a sense this is a worst-case scenario in that it assumes zero expansion of schooling. 
This scenario is not presented as a likely future, but serves reference purposes only. Its 
technical definition is straightforward. 
The assumption is that in each country, the number in each cohort (by gender) 
making each educational transition at the appropriate age remains constant over time. 
Accordingly, the relative share of the attainment levels can rise and fall depending on 
changes in cohort size. 
Constant enrollment ratio (CER) scenario 
Like the previous scenario, the projection of constant transition rates between 
attainment levels (and as a result constant proportions in each level within each cohort) 
serves largely illustrative purposes. It demonstrates the implications of extending the 
status quo into the future, without regard for contextual change. In its disregard of 
historical upward trends and of the opportunity for ‘no-cost expansion’ when cohort size 
declines, it is a somewhat pessimistic scenario. 
The technical definition of the CER scenario is straightforward. In each country, 
the proportion of each cohort (by gender) making each educational transition at the 
appropriate age remains constant over time. 
Global education trend (GET) scenario 
This is the first ‘complex’ scenario that is not derived from a single, simple assumption. 
Informally, the GET scenario assumes that a country’s educational expansion will 
converge on an expansion trajectory based on the historical global trend. 
Identification of the global trend is based on a data-driven judgmental analysis. 
This means it is neither derived by mechanistically applying a statistical model, nor a 
mere ‘expert estimate’, but based on the application of domain knowledge to the 
empirical data. 
From a theoretical perspective, the limiting constraints of educational expansion 
differ at different stages. Initially, expansion in enrollment is likely to be essentially 
limited by the available supply of school places. As long as only a small fraction of each 
cohort is enrolled in primary school, it seems plausible that each additional school that 
is built can be filled with willing students. At this stage, enrollment is largely supply-
limited. Once the vast majority of each cohort is enrolled, say 90 percent or more, the 
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fact that the remaining 10 percent are not enrolled is unlikely to be the result of a lack of 
school places. In fact, by the time 90 percent are enrolled, cohort growth will typically 
have fallen considerably, meaning that raising the enrollment ratio further does not 
require physical expansion. Instead, enrolling the last few percent is typically a matter 
of accessing hard-to-reach populations, such as children in remote rural areas, working 
children, those suffering from disabilities and so on. Complete enrollment of these 
groups in school requires not school expansion, but well-designed and targeted demand-
side interventions. 
In the full complexity of the underlying dynamics, some constraints act on the 
absolute number of attainers, while others act on attainment proportions. However, the 
benefit of explicitly modeling these complexities needs to be weighed against a number 
of practical concerns. First, the historic data and the projection are in five-year intervals, 
not annual. While the ‘true’ model would logically describe the year-on-year change, its 
application to the projection would effectively require the computation of a ‘rolling 
average’. This reduces the potential benefit of a ‘conceptually tidy’ domain model 
because the five-year model does not necessarily share qualitative features of the 
underlying annual model. If the annual model was piece-wise linear, for instance, the 
five-year model would not be. Second, while in theory convergence to universal 
attainment may be asymptotic and never reach a true 100 percent, in practice this 
convergence is cut short in the data because national statistical offices perform rounding 
operations; moreover, these may not be consistent across countries. Third, a two-part 
model (such as a supply-limited phase followed by a demand-limited phase) introduces 
the computational complexity of checking whether the threshold for switching models 
has been crossed after each five-year step and if necessary backtracking and 
recalculating to account for this. In seeking to address these concerns, it was found that 
the trajectories of attainment proportions resulting from these complex dynamics are 
well approximated by the judicious choice of a simple model acting directly on the 
proportions in five-year intervals. 
Both accelerating and decelerating phases of attainment expansion are found to 
be modeled well by cubic splines at all attainment levels. The placement of the point at 
which the curve switches from accelerating to decelerating expansion was chosen to 
ensure the splines connect smoothly. The exact placement is non-critical since the curve 
is approximately linear for much of the central section. Fitting such bi-cubic models to 
each country shows good individual fits (in the vast majority of cases with an adjusted 
R-squared greater than 0.8), and the resulting parameters, indicating the ‘pace’ with 
which different countries traverse the cubic curve, turn out to have a unimodal, fairly 
symmetric and tightly clustered distribution. The parameter means across the individual 
country models may therefore reasonably be considered to constitute the ‘typical’ global 
trend. Countries that had already achieved 99 percent or higher participation were 
excluded in determining the overall mean expansion parameter. The projected 
trajectories resulting from applying these global trend parameters were examined for 
their plausibility. 
Figure 2 superimposes the derived growth trend for female primary education on 
the national 30-year segments from the 1970-2000 reconstruction. It may appear as if 
there are more national trajectories that are steeper than the trend, but this is an optical 
illusion: Especially in the central section of the curve, the steeper national trajectories 
are visually longer than the flatter ones, despite the fact that they all represent 30 years 
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in time and have equal weight. As a result, steeper trajectories are over-represented in 
terms of ‘ink’ on the graph. A plot of the relative slopes shows that the national 
trajectories are actually symmetrically distributed around the central trend. However, it 
is true that some countries have enjoyed much faster attainment growth than the central 
trend. As can be seen from the graph, the most successful countries have managed an 
accelerated development of achieving in 15 years what on average takes 65. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Country- and average growth pattern. 
 
In the case of an education level that already has more than 50 percent 
participation and whose expansion is beginning to decelerate, the parameters indicate 
the slope of the cubic root of the proportion over time in each cohort that fails to attain 
this level. During the acceleration phase, the slopes of the opposite sign conversely 
indicate the annual increase in the cubic root of the proportion of attainers. These slopes 
are -0.0054 for male/primary, -0.0052 for male/secondary, -0.0027 for male/tertiary,      
-0.0082 for female/primary, -0.0074 for female/secondary, and -0.0049 for 
female/tertiary. These values are difficult to interpret on their own, and an illustrative 
translation into growth over time is provided below. However, even the raw parameters 
indicate the consistency of the model. First, overtaking is impossible, since the pace of 
expansion is slower for the higher attainment levels. This is not a pre-specified 
constraint, but an empirical outcome of the model. Second, the parameters reflect the 
fact that despite having started later and starting the study period at a lower level, 
female attainment has been growing more rapidly than male attainment and is in the 
process of catching up. 
The growth curves implied by these parameters are shown in Figure 3. Note that 
for display purposes, the figure assumes that all phases start their expansion at the same 
time. In reality, different lags between schooling phases and attainment rates for males 
and females occur in different countries. Note also that the times indicated in the figure 
should be interpreted with caution, as they indicate the time required to reach true 100 
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percent starting from true zero. The model does not aim to fit the extreme tails, since in 
any case rounding occurs in actual statistical reports, and ‘universal’ schooling is 
generally considered to be achieved when 99 percent or even 98 percent is reached. 
Also, these are average times across stagnating and succeeding countries. What the 
comparison of the average growth patterns across phases and genders shows, however, 
is that while the schooling of girls may have started later, it has been expanding at a 
much faster pace. The gender difference is more or less the same at primary and 
secondary levels, but dramatically greater at the tertiary level. Between 1970 and 2000, 
female tertiary attainment growth has been closer to the pace of male primary or 
secondary expansion in the past. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Relative rate of expansion of different education phases by gender. 
 
In this context the different levels of confidence in the primary/secondary and 
tertiary growth patterns need to be noted. The first two are derived from past 
observations all along the growth curve. As such, it is fairly clear what the trend curve is 
and reasonable to project for countries at its lower end to move along it. With regard to 
tertiary expansion, however, the projection is a genuine extrapolation beyond levels 
currently observed, and should be treated more carefully. 
The application of the GET scenario will normally result in more optimistic 
trajectories of educational attainment than either the CEN or CER scenarios. However, 
it is important to note that in the case of the latter, this is not by definition. In context of 
rapidly falling cohort sizes, the assumption of constant enrollment may in principle 
translate into increases in the proportions at higher attainment levels that are higher than 
the increases implied by the global education trend scenario. In fact, it could be argued 
that the GET scenario is rather conservative. The above parameters imply, for instance, 
that it takes a typical country about 40 years to raise female participation in primary 
schooling from 50 percent to 90 percent, and over 30 years after that to reach 99 
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percent. The latter in particular may seem discouragingly slow (moreover, female 
primary participation has been the fastest process over the period studied), but reflects 
the empirical average. While some countries have expanded access much more quickly, 
others have stagnated and made even less progress during the final decades of the 20th 
century, and this is reflected in the average slope. 
The fast-track (FT) scenario 
In addition to the above scenarios that define lower bounds, worst-case or ‘no change’ 
environments, an optimistic scenario has been defined. This is based on the GET 
scenario defined above, but assumes the achievement of certain milestones. If stated 
targets in attainment are not reached by certain years (both of which are defined below) 
under the assumptions of the GET scenario, then an accelerated rate of growth is 
applied that meets these targets. 
As a result the increases over the global education trend scenario are not in the 
form of uniformly faster growth, but in the form of lifting up the countries that are 
furthest behind. This reflects the actual political dynamics through which such 
acceleration has been attempted in the past. Both the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) and the Education for All (EFA) goals took the form of a ‘milestones’ 
approach, and the EFA Fast Track Initiative (FTI) shows that international support will 
not be indiscriminate and thinly spread, but focused on those countries lagging furthest 
behind. 
Our fast-track scenario illustrates the implications of a new round of similar 
policy initiatives focusing on secondary education (the next logical step after the 
achievement of universal primary education). Since our category E3 is based on 
completed lower secondary, it is assumed that the target proportion will eventually be 
universal attainment of E3 by 2050. Since this target is very far off, however, a more 
achievable intermediate target is assumed for 2030. While no international policy 
frameworks have so far recommended specific targets for tertiary participation, the 
rapid pace of tertiary expansion in many parts of the world displays a great amount of 
ambition in this regard, both individual and national. As an explicitly optimistic 
scenario, the achievement of a proportion of 60 percent at attainment level E4 is 
assumed to be reached by 2050. While this is as high as some of the very highest levels 
observed today, it is already exceeded by the aspirations of teenagers in some 
developing and transitional countries (OECD 2007). Even if the assumptions turn out to 
be over-optimistic (given that it appears increasingly unlikely that the EFA goals for 
enrollment will be achieved in 2015), the scenario will serve as a useful comparison 
with actual developments to assess how much human capital has been ‘lost’ by missing 
the targets. 
For the primary level (E2), the attainment of 99 percent transition to E2 by 2015 
is assumed under the fast-track scenario, corresponding approximately to the 
achievement of the EFA goals. Lower secondary schooling (E3) is assumed to reach 50 
percent of each cohort by 2030, and 90 percent by 2050. Tertiary (E4) is assumed to 
reach 60 percent by 2050. 
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Possible Future Refinements 
Educational policy discontinuities since 1990 
The back-projection dataset on which the global trend is estimated ends in the year 
2000. Since the primary school attainment of 15-19 year olds is considered, this 
indicator reflects primary intake ratios of 10 years before. Effectively, the data on the 
primary schooling of 15-19 year olds up to the year 2000 reflects primary school 
experiences up to 1990. The year 1990 was, of course, marked by the World Conference 
on Education For All in Jomtien, Thailand, at which the initial EFA goals were set. In 
the intervening years, a number of other international policy frameworks for educational 
development, including the MDGs and the FTI, were introduced. 
The question, therefore, arises whether at the primary level, an extrapolation of 
trends prior to 1990 is misleading. It might be assumed that educational expansion has 
since accelerated as a result of the increased international attention. In principle, an 
option is to use intake ratios from 1991-2005 as an additional data source. These are 
available from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics. While our human capital projections 
concern attainment levels, not enrollment, at the primary level there is a convenient 
near-equivalence between intake ratios and our attainment levels: Since the transition 
from our level E1 to E2 is based on having received even a single year of primary 
schooling, the proportion in each year cohort in levels E2 and above is approximately 
equal to the intake ratio into primary school for that cohort. 
The first difficulty arises from the need to match the single year primary intake 
data with our five-year data. This is made more difficult by the fact that the intake 
statistics are not relative to a fixed age cohort, but relative to the ‘official age of school 
entry’ which varies between countries and is not given in the data. More seriously, 
however: While the UNESCO statistics provide data on net intake ratios for children of 
the official school-entry age and those over or under age by one year, in many cases a 
significant proportion of entrants appear to be more than one year over age. Using the 
gross intake ratio does not resolve these problems. 
Unfortunately, the UNESCO data is far from complete for all countries in our 
database for the years 1991-2005. Concerns have also been raised about their 
consistency and reliability. Enrollment data are notoriously inflated. For these reasons it 
was decided that the UNESCO primary intake statistics cannot be used to validate the 
continuity of the historical trend at this stage until its inconsistencies have been weeded 
out and the methodological issues resolved. 
Country-specific growth 
The global education trend scenario captures an average pattern across all countries 
undergoing expansion of school provision. Inevitably, it does not capture the specific 
circumstances of individual countries. At the global or regional level the projection 
appears plausible. However, country-level trajectories should not be interpreted as an 
anticipation of actual future development, but as indicative of educational development 
under the assumption that the country converges with global trends, barring 
discontinuities and external ‘shocks’. A possible future extension is to combine a 
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country-effects model for parameter estimation with qualitative country-specific 
scenarios for select cases. 
Parental education 
As mentioned previously, the effects of parents’ education on the educational attainment 
of their children is incorporated implicitly rather than explicitly in the current 
projections. It is reflected in the projections because the historical expansion patterns on 
which the projections are based were partly shaped by this effect. It is, however, not 
explicitly included in the sense that the modeled cohort of births instantly ‘forgets’ its 
parents’ education. 
An option for the future is to retain the distribution of parents’ education for the 
first five or ten years of simulated life. This would not only allow for differentials in 
infant mortality by parental education to be taken into account, but also to track 
developments over time. Because fertility declines with increasing education, the 
educational attainment level of the parents of the average child will be significantly 
lower than the average educational attainment of the population of childbearing age. By 
implication, projections of population attainment will overestimate the education 
environment that children will be exposed to at home. Projecting the latter separately is 
therefore of intrinsic interest. 
Results and Discussion 
Sample Output 
As an example of the kind of results obtained through the projection, the following five 
pages contain the full projection output for Pakistan, including age pyramids by 
education at various points in time and for the different education scenarios, as well as 
tabular output of the full age-sex-education population distribution in five-year intervals 
from the baseline year 2000 to 2050. The results for Pakistan clearly show the 
tremendous difference in the education level of the population between the different 
scenarios, and over time under the GET scenario. 
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Pakistan - Population by Age, Sex and Educational Attainment in 2050 
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Pakistan - Population by Age, Sex and Educational Attainment in 2015 
- Global Education Trend - Scenario
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Population in thousand by education, age and sex in Pakistan ‐ Global Education Trend Scenario
Male Female Both Sexes
Age Group noedu pri sec ter MYS noedu pri sec ter MYS noedu pri sec ter MYS
2000 15‐19 2033.6 2039.8 4104.5 0.0 5.95 3313.0 1450.9 2907.7 0.0 4.50 5346.6 3490.7 7012.2 0.0 5.25
20‐24 1747.9 1228.8 3108.2 407.4 6.44 1747.9 1228.8 3108.2 407.4 4.36 3495.9 2457.6 6216.4 814.8 5.44
25‐29 1661.4 1005.6 2098.6 495.5 6.12 1661.4 1005.6 2098.6 495.5 3.33 3322.8 2011.2 4197.2 991.0 4.77
30‐34 1688.7 848.4 1543.3 533.3 5.77 1688.7 848.4 1543.3 533.3 2.65 3377.5 1696.8 3086.6 1066.6 4.26
35‐39 1750.4 777.2 1288.3 378.1 5.12 1750.4 777.2 1288.3 378.1 2.38 3500.8 1554.4 2576.6 756.2 3.80
40‐44 1642.1 616.7 1061.3 301.2 4.82 1642.1 616.7 1061.3 301.2 1.79 3284.2 1233.4 2122.5 602.3 3.37
45‐49 1337.2 578.6 822.9 225.0 4.65 1337.2 578.6 822.9 225.0 1.67 2674.3 1157.2 1645.7 450.0 3.23
50‐54 1149.1 395.8 517.1 146.8 4.01 1149.1 395.8 517.1 146.8 1.34 2298.2 791.6 1034.2 293.7 2.72
55‐59 940.0 315.4 364.9 117.5 3.79 940.0 315.4 364.9 117.5 0.97 1879.9 630.8 729.7 235.0 2.38
60‐64 873.8 218.4 263.3 72.8 3.18 873.8 218.4 263.3 72.8 0.63 1747.6 436.9 526.5 145.6 1.90
65‐69 737.0 160.9 153.8 34.1 2.44 737.0 160.9 153.8 34.1 0.68 1474.0 321.8 307.6 68.3 1.55
70‐74 532.0 103.7 90.5 20.3 2.14 532.0 103.7 90.5 20.3 0.50 1064.0 207.5 180.9 40.6 1.28
75‐79 321.4 55.9 44.4 10.1 1.86 321.4 55.9 44.4 10.1 0.37 642.8 111.7 88.9 20.2 1.11
80+ 269.6 39.5 27.7 6.4 1.52 302.4 6.1 4.9 0.5 0.25 571.9 45.6 32.5 6.9 0.91
15+ 16684.2 8384.7 15488.6 2748.5 5.25 26909.4 4777.6 7798.9 1279.4 2.82 43593.6 13162.3 23287.5 4027.9 4.08
25+ 12902.6 5116.1 8275.9 2341.1 4.79 20526.4 2453.6 3173.6 880.0 2.00 33429.0 7569.6 11449.5 3221.1 3.43
2005 15‐19 2189.3 2427.4 5426.2 0.0 6.31 3448.8 1828.9 4162.7 0.0 5.14 5638.1 4256.3 9588.9 0.0 5.74
20‐24 1987.8 1322.6 4146.0 546.0 6.82 1987.8 1322.6 4146.0 546.0 5.07 3975.5 2645.2 8292.1 1092.1 5.98
25‐29 1702.3 1197.7 2781.3 650.7 6.64 1702.3 1197.7 2781.3 650.7 4.40 3404.5 2395.4 5562.6 1301.4 5.56
30‐34 1624.1 984.0 1897.3 646.4 6.28 1624.1 984.0 1897.3 646.4 3.33 3248.3 1968.1 3794.7 1292.8 4.86
35‐39 1653.0 831.6 1516.2 524.9 5.78 1653.0 831.6 1516.2 524.9 2.65 3305.9 1663.1 3032.5 1049.9 4.27
40‐44 1707.4 759.6 1263.5 371.9 5.13 1707.4 759.6 1263.5 371.9 2.39 3414.8 1519.2 2527.0 743.7 3.81
45‐49 1587.9 598.2 1034.9 295.0 4.84 1587.9 598.2 1034.9 295.0 1.80 3175.9 1196.4 2069.9 590.0 3.39
50‐54 1272.0 553.0 793.2 218.4 4.68 1272.0 553.0 793.2 218.4 1.68 2544.1 1106.1 1586.4 436.9 3.25
55‐59 1065.7 369.8 489.4 140.5 4.06 1065.7 369.8 489.4 140.5 1.36 2131.4 739.5 978.8 281.1 2.74
60‐64 837.5 283.9 334.8 109.6 3.87 837.5 283.9 334.8 109.6 0.99 1675.1 567.9 669.6 219.3 2.41
65‐69 735.2 186.3 230.3 65.2 3.27 735.2 186.3 230.3 65.2 0.65 1470.5 372.6 460.6 130.4 1.93
70‐74 572.5 127.0 125.2 28.7 2.53 572.5 127.0 125.2 28.7 0.71 1144.9 253.9 250.5 57.3 1.60
75‐79 369.0 73.2 66.1 15.4 2.23 369.0 73.2 66.1 15.4 0.53 738.0 146.4 132.3 30.8 1.33
80+ 309.2 51.6 40.9 9.7 1.82 382.1 10.0 8.7 1.1 0.35 691.4 61.6 49.6 10.8 1.09
15+ 17613.0 9765.9 20145.5 3622.5 5.72 28718.1 6251.7 11350.4 1877.4 3.43 46331.1 16017.6 31495.9 5499.9 4.61
25+ 13435.9 6015.9 10573.3 3076.5 5.27 22036.0 3214.9 4725.3 1287.3 2.51 35472.0 9230.8 15298.5 4363.8 3.93
2010 15‐19 1931.6 2378.6 5858.7 0.0 6.64 2942.2 1807.8 4865.0 0.0 5.76 4873.8 4186.4 10723.7 0.0 6.21
20‐24 2144.2 1517.2 5460.1 724.7 7.23 2144.2 1517.2 5460.1 724.7 5.79 4288.4 3034.4 10920.1 1449.5 6.53
25‐29 1940.4 1292.1 3721.2 868.9 7.04 1940.4 1292.1 3721.2 868.9 5.11 3880.9 2584.1 7442.5 1737.8 6.11
30‐34 1667.2 1174.1 2526.3 844.1 6.81 1667.2 1174.1 2526.3 844.1 4.41 3334.3 2348.2 5052.5 1688.2 5.65
35‐39 1591.7 965.6 1865.6 636.7 6.29 1591.7 965.6 1865.6 636.7 3.34 3183.4 1931.1 3731.3 1273.3 4.87
40‐44 1614.6 813.8 1488.4 516.6 5.79 1614.6 813.8 1488.4 516.6 2.66 3229.3 1627.5 2976.8 1033.2 4.28
45‐49 1655.5 738.6 1234.7 364.9 5.16 1655.5 738.6 1234.7 364.9 2.40 3311.0 1477.2 2469.4 729.7 3.83
50‐54 1516.8 574.0 1001.0 287.2 4.87 1516.8 574.0 1001.0 287.2 1.82 3033.7 1148.0 2002.1 574.5 3.41
55‐59 1185.5 519.0 753.9 209.8 4.73 1185.5 519.0 753.9 209.8 1.70 2371.0 1038.1 1507.7 419.6 3.28
60‐64 956.1 335.1 451.9 131.9 4.14 956.1 335.1 451.9 131.9 1.38 1912.1 670.2 903.8 263.8 2.78
65‐69 709.7 243.8 294.8 98.8 3.97 709.7 243.8 294.8 98.8 1.02 1419.4 487.6 589.7 197.6 2.46
70‐74 576.3 148.4 189.3 55.3 3.38 576.3 148.4 189.3 55.3 0.67 1152.7 296.8 378.7 110.6 1.98
75‐79 403.1 91.0 93.1 22.1 2.63 403.1 91.0 93.1 22.1 0.75 806.2 182.0 186.1 44.2 1.65
80+ 361.0 68.8 61.9 15.1 2.18 504.7 17.2 16.6 2.8 0.50 865.7 86.0 78.5 17.9 1.31
15+ 18253.8 10860.0 25000.9 4776.1 6.15 29915.9 7600.0 15325.6 2743.7 4.01 48169.7 18460.0 40326.5 7519.8 5.11
25+ 14178.0 6964.2 13682.1 4051.3 5.75 23600.3 4280.5 6959.5 1887.7 3.10 37778.3 11244.7 20641.7 5939.1 4.47
2015 15‐19 1653.2 2054.4 6347.2 0.0 7.08 2407.3 1634.5 5455.5 0.0 6.39 4060.6 3688.9 11802.6 0.0 6.74
20‐24 1905.5 1437.9 5902.1 795.8 7.60 1905.5 1437.9 5902.1 795.8 6.51 3811.0 2875.8 11804.2 1591.6 7.07
25‐29 2114.2 1497.0 4945.2 1164.8 7.46 2114.2 1497.0 4945.2 1164.8 5.84 4228.5 2994.0 9890.4 2329.6 6.67
30‐34 1915.2 1276.3 3405.6 1135.8 7.23 1915.2 1276.3 3405.6 1135.8 5.12 3830.4 2552.6 6811.2 2271.6 6.21
35‐39 1643.9 1159.0 2498.5 836.1 6.82 1643.9 1159.0 2498.5 836.1 4.41 3287.9 2318.0 4997.0 1672.2 5.66
40‐44 1563.1 949.8 1840.3 629.5 6.30 1563.1 949.8 1840.3 629.5 3.35 3126.1 1899.5 3680.7 1259.0 4.88
45‐49 1573.5 795.1 1461.0 509.0 5.81 1573.5 795.1 1461.0 509.0 2.67 3147.0 1590.3 2922.0 1018.0 4.30
50‐54 1591.0 712.9 1200.6 357.0 5.19 1591.0 712.9 1200.6 357.0 2.42 3181.9 1425.7 2401.2 714.0 3.85
55‐59 1423.9 542.5 957.6 277.6 4.93 1423.9 542.5 957.6 277.6 1.84 2847.9 1085.0 1915.1 555.1 3.44
60‐64 1071.7 473.9 700.9 198.2 4.81 1071.7 473.9 700.9 198.2 1.74 2143.4 947.8 1401.8 396.4 3.32
65‐69 818.9 290.8 402.1 120.0 4.24 818.9 290.8 402.1 120.0 1.43 1637.7 581.7 804.2 240.1 2.84
70‐74 562.6 196.4 245.2 84.7 4.09 562.6 196.4 245.2 84.7 1.07 1125.1 392.8 490.3 169.4 2.52
75‐79 411.4 107.8 142.8 43.3 3.52 411.4 107.8 142.8 43.3 0.71 822.7 215.6 285.5 86.6 2.05
80+ 412.9 89.5 91.2 22.7 2.58 600.1 26.2 27.5 6.1 0.70 1013.1 115.7 118.8 28.8 1.61
15+ 18661.0 11583.3 30140.3 6174.5 6.57 30612.5 8754.8 19744.2 3802.3 4.57 49273.5 20338.2 49884.4 9976.7 5.60
25+ 15102.2 8091.1 17891.0 5378.7 6.24 25304.5 5643.7 10203.5 2777.3 3.75 40406.7 13734.8 28094.5 8156.0 5.03
2020 15‐19 1323.1 1614.4 6426.9 0.0 7.51 1829.6 1356.7 5638.1 0.0 6.97 3152.7 2971.1 12065.1 0.0 7.25
20‐24 1633.1 1318.4 6143.4 846.9 7.95 1633.1 1318.4 6143.4 846.9 7.19 3266.3 2636.8 12286.7 1693.8 7.58
25‐29 1882.0 1421.0 5345.6 1281.1 7.86 1882.0 1421.0 5345.6 1281.1 6.56 3764.0 2842.0 10691.1 2562.2 7.23
30‐34 2092.0 1482.3 4532.5 1526.3 7.66 2092.0 1482.3 4532.5 1526.3 5.84 4183.9 2964.6 9065.0 3052.6 6.78
35‐39 1892.9 1262.7 3375.1 1127.2 7.23 1892.9 1262.7 3375.1 1127.2 5.12 3785.8 2525.4 6750.2 2254.4 6.21
40‐44 1618.3 1142.6 2469.7 828.2 6.83 1618.3 1142.6 2469.7 828.2 4.42 3236.5 2285.3 4939.3 1656.4 5.67
45‐49 1527.2 930.2 1810.2 621.3 6.32 1527.2 930.2 1810.2 621.3 3.36 3054.3 1860.5 3620.3 1242.6 4.89
50‐54 1516.5 769.5 1423.9 499.0 5.85 1516.5 769.5 1423.9 499.0 2.69 3033.0 1538.9 2847.8 997.9 4.32
55‐59 1500.0 676.5 1152.7 346.1 5.24 1500.0 676.5 1152.7 346.1 2.44 3000.0 1353.0 2305.3 692.1 3.88
60‐64 1295.0 498.2 895.1 263.4 5.00 1295.0 498.2 895.1 263.4 1.88 2590.0 996.4 1790.2 526.9 3.48
65‐69 923.7 413.9 627.5 181.4 4.91 923.7 413.9 627.5 181.4 1.79 1847.5 827.8 1254.9 362.7 3.38
70‐74 655.9 236.8 337.9 103.9 4.37 655.9 236.8 337.9 103.9 1.49 1311.8 473.6 675.8 207.9 2.91
75‐79 405.9 144.3 187.0 67.1 4.25 405.9 144.3 187.0 67.1 1.13 811.8 288.7 374.1 134.2 2.61
80+ 446.7 111.2 140.1 41.8 3.30 724.3 32.6 39.4 6.2 0.76 1171.0 143.8 179.5 47.9 1.98
15+ 18712.3 12022.1 34867.5 7733.6 6.95 30652.1 9661.3 24085.2 5014.6 5.08 49364.4 21683.4 58952.7 12748.2 6.04
25+ 15756.1 9089.3 22297.2 6886.7 6.67 26445.5 6944.1 13973.0 3840.8 4.36 42201.6 16033.4 36270.3 10727.5 5.55
2025 15‐19 1248.6 1435.1 7683.3 0.0 7.93 1632.0 1301.8 6829.1 0.0 7.50 2880.6 2736.9 14512.5 0.0 7.72
20‐24 1306.8 1132.5 5971.8 846.1 8.28 1306.8 1132.5 5971.8 846.1 7.81 2613.6 2265.0 11943.5 1692.3 8.05
25‐29 1613.8 1303.4 5554.2 1363.8 8.22 1613.8 1303.4 5554.2 1363.8 7.24 3227.5 2606.9 11108.4 2727.7 7.75
30‐34 1863.6 1408.0 4894.9 1679.8 8.07 1863.6 1408.0 4894.9 1679.8 6.57 3727.2 2816.0 9789.8 3359.6 7.34
35‐39 2070.7 1468.6 4497.7 1516.5 7.67 2070.7 1468.6 4497.7 1516.5 5.85 4141.5 2937.2 8995.3 3032.9 6.78
40‐44 1866.7 1247.0 3341.0 1117.9 7.24 1866.7 1247.0 3341.0 1117.9 5.13 3733.3 2493.9 6682.1 2235.9 6.22
45‐49 1584.4 1121.3 2433.2 818.6 6.85 1584.4 1121.3 2433.2 818.6 4.44 3168.7 2242.6 4866.3 1637.1 5.68
50‐54 1475.5 902.3 1767.6 610.0 6.35 1475.5 902.3 1767.6 610.0 3.38 2951.1 1804.6 3535.3 1220.1 4.91
55‐59 1433.8 732.1 1370.0 484.6 5.90 1433.8 732.1 1370.0 484.6 2.72 2867.6 1464.3 2740.1 969.1 4.35
60‐64 1370.5 624.1 1081.9 329.7 5.32 1370.5 624.1 1081.9 329.7 2.49 2740.9 1248.2 2163.8 659.3 3.93
65‐69 1123.8 438.1 806.5 242.6 5.11 1123.8 438.1 806.5 242.6 1.93 2247.5 876.1 1612.9 485.1 3.54
70‐74 745.1 339.4 531.0 158.1 5.05 745.1 339.4 531.0 158.1 1.86 1490.3 678.8 1062.1 316.3 3.46
75‐79 478.8 176.1 261.0 83.4 4.52 478.8 176.1 261.0 83.4 1.57 957.7 352.2 522.0 166.8 3.01
80+ 461.6 146.1 196.4 69.4 4.07 835.9 52.6 57.6 15.7 1.05 1297.5 198.7 254.0 85.1 2.49
15+ 18643.6 12474.2 40390.6 9320.5 7.31 30383.6 10560.1 29376.3 6305.0 5.58 49027.3 23034.3 69766.8 15625.6 6.47
25+ 16088.3 9906.5 26735.5 8474.4 7.05 26945.3 8090.5 18056.2 5051.1 4.93 43033.6 17997.0 44791.7 13525.5 6.02  
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Population in thousand by education, age and sex in Pakistan ‐ Global Education Trend Scenario
Male Female Both Sexes
Age Group noedu pri sec ter MYS noedu pri sec ter MYS noedu pri sec ter MYS
2030 15‐19 1149.5 1160.3 8987.9 0.0 8.34 1410.6 1184.0 8047.4 0.0 7.98 2560.0 2344.3 17035.3 0.0 8.17
20‐24 1234.7 1153.2 6867.9 1004.7 8.58 1234.7 1153.2 6867.9 1004.7 8.38 2469.4 2306.4 13735.8 2009.3 8.49
25‐29 1291.2 1119.5 5383.4 1362.4 8.57 1291.2 1119.5 5383.4 1362.4 7.88 2582.3 2239.0 10766.8 2724.8 8.23
30‐34 1598.8 1292.1 5077.0 1789.1 8.45 1598.8 1292.1 5077.0 1789.1 7.25 3197.6 2584.3 10154.0 3578.2 7.87
35‐39 1846.1 1396.0 4860.0 1669.7 8.07 1846.1 1396.0 4860.0 1669.7 6.57 3692.2 2792.0 9720.0 3339.4 7.34
40‐44 2045.1 1452.3 4457.5 1505.6 7.67 2045.1 1452.3 4457.5 1505.6 5.86 4090.1 2904.6 8915.0 3011.2 6.79
45‐49 1831.0 1225.8 3296.5 1106.4 7.26 1831.0 1225.8 3296.5 1106.4 5.15 3662.0 2451.6 6593.1 2212.7 6.24
50‐54 1534.3 1089.9 2380.2 804.9 6.88 1534.3 1089.9 2380.2 804.9 4.46 3068.6 2179.8 4760.5 1609.8 5.70
55‐59 1399.0 860.8 1704.6 593.5 6.40 1399.0 860.8 1704.6 593.5 3.41 2798.0 1721.5 3409.2 1187.1 4.95
60‐64 1314.2 677.4 1289.3 462.6 5.98 1314.2 677.4 1289.3 462.6 2.77 2628.3 1354.8 2578.6 925.2 4.40
65‐69 1196.1 551.8 980.0 305.0 5.42 1196.1 551.8 980.0 305.0 2.55 2392.2 1103.6 1959.9 610.0 3.99
70‐74 914.2 362.2 688.3 213.2 5.25 914.2 362.2 688.3 213.2 2.01 1828.3 724.5 1376.6 426.4 3.63
75‐79 548.7 254.7 413.9 128.0 5.21 548.7 254.7 413.9 128.0 1.96 1097.4 509.3 827.9 256.1 3.57
80+ 519.3 186.1 277.3 96.6 4.56 964.4 69.8 105.8 26.2 1.47 1483.8 255.9 383.1 122.7 2.95
15+ 18422.0 12782.1 46663.9 11041.7 7.65 29783.9 11368.7 35395.7 7917.2 6.10 48205.9 24150.8 82059.6 18958.9 6.90
25+ 16037.8 10468.6 30808.1 10037.1 7.39 26759.8 8999.5 22074.9 6329.7 5.45 42797.6 19468.1 52882.9 16366.8 6.44
2035 15‐19 991.6 1089.2 9573.1 0.0 8.56 1132.2 1097.7 8754.9 0.0 8.34 2123.9 2186.9 18328.0 0.0 8.46
20‐24 1137.8 1150.4 7731.7 1172.2 8.86 1137.8 1150.4 7731.7 1172.2 8.91 2275.6 2300.8 15463.4 2344.3 8.89
25‐29 1221.4 1141.3 6178.1 1619.5 8.89 1221.4 1141.3 6178.1 1619.5 8.46 2442.7 2282.5 12356.3 3238.9 8.68
30‐34 1279.4 1109.9 4907.8 1787.4 8.81 1279.4 1109.9 4907.8 1787.4 7.88 2558.7 2219.8 9815.6 3574.8 8.36
35‐39 1584.7 1281.8 5042.8 1778.9 8.46 1584.7 1281.8 5042.8 1778.9 7.25 3169.4 2563.5 10085.7 3557.8 7.87
40‐44 1824.8 1381.6 4819.8 1658.6 8.08 1824.8 1381.6 4819.8 1658.6 6.58 3649.7 2763.2 9639.5 3317.2 7.35
45‐49 2009.2 1429.7 4403.6 1491.5 7.69 2009.2 1429.7 4403.6 1491.5 5.87 4018.3 2859.5 8807.2 2983.1 6.81
50‐54 1776.9 1193.8 3230.2 1089.4 7.29 1776.9 1193.8 3230.2 1089.4 5.17 3553.8 2387.6 6460.4 2178.9 6.26
55‐59 1458.3 1042.2 2299.9 784.4 6.92 1458.3 1042.2 2299.9 784.4 4.49 2916.6 2084.4 4599.9 1568.9 5.74
60‐64 1286.3 798.8 1608.4 567.9 6.48 1286.3 798.8 1608.4 567.9 3.46 2572.6 1597.7 3216.7 1135.9 5.00
65‐69 1151.1 601.1 1171.6 429.2 6.09 1151.1 601.1 1171.6 429.2 2.83 2302.2 1202.2 2343.2 858.5 4.46
70‐74 979.8 459.5 842.1 269.9 5.56 979.8 459.5 842.1 269.9 2.64 1959.5 919.0 1684.2 539.7 4.08
75‐79 679.8 274.5 542.1 174.4 5.43 679.8 274.5 542.1 174.4 2.12 1359.6 549.1 1084.1 348.8 3.74
80+ 599.9 259.4 427.4 143.5 5.17 1183.2 117.6 170.8 51.2 1.92 1783.1 377.0 598.2 194.7 3.49
15+ 17980.9 13213.2 52778.6 12966.8 7.96 28795.1 12143.6 41512.2 9914.9 6.60 46776.0 25356.8 94290.8 22881.7 7.30
25+ 15851.5 10973.6 35473.9 11794.7 7.73 26266.6 9872.2 26754.3 7946.5 5.98 42118.0 20845.8 62228.2 19741.2 6.88
2040 15‐19 801.9 963.9 9630.4 0.0 8.77 842.3 953.8 8957.7 0.0 8.66 1644.2 1917.7 18588.1 0.0 8.72
20‐24 982.1 1080.3 8195.9 1292.0 9.12 982.1 1080.3 8195.9 1292.0 9.40 1964.2 2160.5 16391.9 2583.9 9.26
25‐29 1126.6 1139.5 6935.4 1891.2 9.19 1126.6 1139.5 6935.4 1891.2 9.00 2253.2 2279.0 13870.7 3782.3 9.10
30‐34 1211.3 1132.4 5618.5 2126.4 9.15 1211.3 1132.4 5618.5 2126.4 8.46 2422.6 2264.8 11237.0 4252.8 8.82
35‐39 1268.6 1101.3 4875.6 1777.3 8.82 1268.6 1101.3 4875.6 1777.3 7.88 2537.1 2202.6 9751.3 3554.7 8.36
40‐44 1567.7 1269.4 5003.6 1767.7 8.46 1567.7 1269.4 5003.6 1767.7 7.26 3135.3 2538.8 10007.3 3535.5 7.88
45‐49 1794.9 1361.5 4765.2 1644.1 8.09 1794.9 1361.5 4765.2 1644.1 6.59 3589.7 2723.0 9530.5 3288.2 7.36
50‐54 1953.5 1394.8 4321.0 1470.4 7.71 1953.5 1394.8 4321.0 1470.4 5.89 3906.9 2789.6 8642.0 2940.8 6.82
55‐59 1692.8 1144.3 3127.3 1063.3 7.33 1692.8 1144.3 3127.3 1063.3 5.20 3385.6 2288.6 6254.6 2126.7 6.29
60‐64 1344.7 969.8 2175.1 752.0 7.00 1344.7 969.8 2175.1 752.0 4.55 2689.4 1939.7 4350.2 1504.0 5.79
65‐69 1131.1 711.5 1466.5 528.5 6.58 1131.1 711.5 1466.5 528.5 3.54 2262.1 1423.0 2933.0 1057.0 5.07
70‐74 947.0 502.7 1011.0 381.2 6.23 947.0 502.7 1011.0 381.2 2.93 1894.1 1005.4 2022.0 762.5 4.56
75‐79 734.6 351.2 669.0 222.7 5.74 734.6 351.2 669.0 222.7 2.76 1469.3 702.4 1338.0 445.3 4.20
80+ 732.1 312.6 601.4 204.5 5.54 1494.4 174.0 241.6 88.2 2.20 2226.6 486.6 843.1 292.8 3.81
15+ 17288.8 13435.3 58396.1 15121.4 8.26 27384.8 12707.2 47344.1 12242.4 7.07 44673.6 26142.5 105740.2 27363.8 7.68
25+ 15504.8 11391.1 40569.8 13829.4 8.07 25421.0 10664.8 32007.3 9944.5 6.53 40925.8 22056.0 72577.0 23773.9 7.31
2045 15‐19 632.3 837.5 9538.6 0.0 8.95 602.8 808.6 8999.3 0.0 8.94 1235.1 1646.0 18537.9 0.0 8.94
20‐24 794.2 955.9 8197.6 1347.5 9.36 794.2 955.9 8197.6 1347.5 9.85 1588.4 1911.9 16395.2 2695.0 9.60
25‐29 972.9 1070.6 7323.9 2085.4 9.48 972.9 1070.6 7323.9 2085.4 9.49 1945.8 2141.1 14647.8 4170.8 9.48
30‐34 1118.1 1131.4 6287.3 2484.7 9.47 1118.1 1131.4 6287.3 2484.7 9.00 2236.2 2262.9 12574.6 4969.5 9.24
35‐39 1202.0 1124.4 5585.0 2115.6 9.16 1202.0 1124.4 5585.0 2115.6 8.46 2403.9 2248.9 11170.1 4231.1 8.82
40‐44 1255.6 1091.2 4839.3 1766.5 8.82 1255.6 1091.2 4839.3 1766.5 7.89 2511.1 2182.3 9678.5 3533.1 8.37
45‐49 1543.4 1252.0 4950.3 1753.2 8.47 1543.4 1252.0 4950.3 1753.2 7.27 3086.8 2504.0 9900.6 3506.3 7.89
50‐54 1747.7 1330.0 4680.7 1622.1 8.12 1747.7 1330.0 4680.7 1622.1 6.61 3495.4 2660.0 9361.4 3244.1 7.38
55‐59 1865.0 1339.7 4190.3 1437.0 7.75 1865.0 1339.7 4190.3 1437.0 5.92 3730.0 2679.5 8380.7 2874.0 6.85
60‐64 1565.7 1067.8 2964.6 1021.3 7.40 1565.7 1067.8 2964.6 1021.3 5.25 3131.4 2135.7 5929.2 2042.6 6.34
65‐69 1186.8 866.9 1989.4 701.6 7.10 1186.8 866.9 1989.4 701.6 4.63 2373.7 1733.7 3978.9 1403.3 5.86
70‐74 935.4 598.1 1271.7 471.5 6.72 935.4 598.1 1271.7 471.5 3.65 1870.7 1196.2 2543.3 942.9 5.16
75‐79 714.2 386.5 808.0 316.4 6.42 714.2 386.5 808.0 316.4 3.07 1428.3 773.0 1616.0 632.8 4.68
80+ 842.3 391.9 786.2 275.4 5.86 1759.3 273.3 406.5 120.6 2.70 2601.5 665.2 1192.7 396.0 4.19
15+ 16375.4 13443.9 63412.9 17398.2 8.55 25604.4 13039.5 52780.4 14784.4 7.52 41979.8 26483.4 116193.3 32182.6 8.04
25+ 14948.9 11650.5 45676.7 16050.7 8.39 24167.2 11285.2 37433.9 12253.9 7.05 39116.1 22935.7 83110.6 28304.6 7.73
2050 15‐19 503.4 740.3 9650.2 0.0 9.11 427.3 691.5 9208.7 0.0 9.17 930.7 1431.8 18858.9 0.0 9.14
20‐24 626.3 830.4 8067.1 1386.2 9.59 626.3 830.4 8067.1 1386.2 10.27 1252.5 1660.8 16134.2 2772.5 9.92
25‐29 786.9 947.4 7291.2 2175.2 9.74 786.9 947.4 7291.2 2175.2 9.95 1573.8 1894.9 14582.3 4350.3 9.84
30‐34 966.0 1063.4 6613.4 2741.0 9.77 966.0 1063.4 6613.4 2741.0 9.50 1932.0 2126.8 13226.8 5482.0 9.64
35‐39 1110.2 1124.1 6253.1 2473.2 9.47 1110.2 1124.1 6253.1 2473.2 9.00 2220.4 2248.3 12506.1 4946.3 9.24
40‐44 1190.6 1114.9 5546.8 2103.8 9.16 1190.6 1114.9 5546.8 2103.8 8.47 2381.3 2229.8 11093.7 4207.6 8.82
45‐49 1237.1 1077.0 4790.1 1752.6 8.83 1237.1 1077.0 4790.1 1752.6 7.90 2474.3 2153.9 9580.2 3505.1 8.38
50‐54 1504.8 1224.5 4866.9 1730.8 8.49 1504.8 1224.5 4866.9 1730.8 7.29 3009.7 2449.0 9733.8 3461.6 7.90
55‐59 1671.7 1279.6 4545.1 1586.8 8.15 1671.7 1279.6 4545.1 1586.8 6.64 3343.3 2559.2 9090.1 3173.6 7.41
60‐64 1729.4 1253.2 3980.3 1382.4 7.82 1729.4 1253.2 3980.3 1382.4 5.97 3458.9 2506.5 7960.6 2764.9 6.90
65‐69 1386.8 957.7 2719.8 955.4 7.50 1386.8 957.7 2719.8 955.4 5.33 2773.6 1915.5 5439.6 1910.8 6.41
70‐74 985.8 731.8 1732.2 628.2 7.23 985.8 731.8 1732.2 628.2 4.75 1971.5 1463.7 3464.3 1256.4 5.96
75‐79 709.6 462.6 1022.6 393.7 6.90 709.6 462.6 1022.6 393.7 3.81 1419.1 925.3 2045.2 787.3 5.29
80+ 884.5 458.3 983.2 385.0 6.39 2020.6 363.0 549.9 188.2 3.10 2905.0 821.3 1533.0 573.2 4.63
15+ 15293.0 13265.4 68061.8 19694.3 8.82 23535.0 13152.8 57959.5 17497.2 7.95 38827.9 26418.2 126021.3 37191.5 8.39
25+ 14163.3 11694.8 50344.5 18308.0 8.70 22510.7 11659.7 42576.4 14754.2 7.55 36674.0 23354.5 92921.0 33062.2 8.13  
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Proportion of people by education, age and sex in Pakistan ‐ Global Education Trend Scenario
Male Female Both Sexes
noedu prim sec ter noedu prim sec ter noedu prim sec ter
2000 15‐19 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.00 0.43 0.19 0.38 0.00 0.34 0.22 0.44 0.00
20‐24 0.27 0.19 0.48 0.06 0.27 0.19 0.48 0.06 0.27 0.19 0.48 0.06
25‐29 0.32 0.19 0.40 0.09 0.32 0.19 0.40 0.09 0.32 0.19 0.40 0.09
30‐34 0.37 0.18 0.33 0.12 0.37 0.18 0.33 0.12 0.37 0.18 0.33 0.12
35‐39 0.42 0.19 0.31 0.09 0.42 0.19 0.31 0.09 0.42 0.19 0.31 0.09
40‐44 0.45 0.17 0.29 0.08 0.45 0.17 0.29 0.08 0.45 0.17 0.29 0.08
45‐49 0.45 0.20 0.28 0.08 0.45 0.20 0.28 0.08 0.45 0.20 0.28 0.08
50‐54 0.52 0.18 0.23 0.07 0.52 0.18 0.23 0.07 0.52 0.18 0.23 0.07
55‐59 0.54 0.18 0.21 0.07 0.54 0.18 0.21 0.07 0.54 0.18 0.21 0.07
60‐64 0.61 0.15 0.18 0.05 0.61 0.15 0.18 0.05 0.61 0.15 0.18 0.05
65‐69 0.68 0.15 0.14 0.03 0.68 0.15 0.14 0.03 0.68 0.15 0.14 0.03
70‐74 0.71 0.14 0.12 0.03 0.71 0.14 0.12 0.03 0.71 0.14 0.12 0.03
75‐79 0.74 0.13 0.10 0.02 0.74 0.13 0.10 0.02 0.74 0.13 0.10 0.02
80+ 0.79 0.12 0.08 0.02 0.96 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.87 0.07 0.05 0.01
15+ 0.39 0.19 0.36 0.06 0.66 0.12 0.19 0.03 0.52 0.16 0.28 0.05
25+ 0.45 0.18 0.29 0.08 0.76 0.09 0.12 0.03 0.60 0.14 0.21 0.06
2005 15‐19 0.22 0.24 0.54 0.00 0.37 0.19 0.44 0.00 0.29 0.22 0.49 0.00
20‐24 0.25 0.17 0.52 0.07 0.25 0.17 0.52 0.07 0.25 0.17 0.52 0.07
25‐29 0.27 0.19 0.44 0.10 0.27 0.19 0.44 0.10 0.27 0.19 0.44 0.10
30‐34 0.32 0.19 0.37 0.13 0.32 0.19 0.37 0.13 0.32 0.19 0.37 0.13
35‐39 0.37 0.18 0.34 0.12 0.37 0.18 0.34 0.12 0.37 0.18 0.34 0.12
40‐44 0.42 0.19 0.31 0.09 0.42 0.19 0.31 0.09 0.42 0.19 0.31 0.09
45‐49 0.45 0.17 0.29 0.08 0.45 0.17 0.29 0.08 0.45 0.17 0.29 0.08
50‐54 0.45 0.19 0.28 0.08 0.45 0.19 0.28 0.08 0.45 0.19 0.28 0.08
55‐59 0.52 0.18 0.24 0.07 0.52 0.18 0.24 0.07 0.52 0.18 0.24 0.07
60‐64 0.53 0.18 0.21 0.07 0.53 0.18 0.21 0.07 0.53 0.18 0.21 0.07
65‐69 0.60 0.15 0.19 0.05 0.60 0.15 0.19 0.05 0.60 0.15 0.19 0.05
70‐74 0.67 0.15 0.15 0.03 0.67 0.15 0.15 0.03 0.67 0.15 0.15 0.03
75‐79 0.70 0.14 0.13 0.03 0.70 0.14 0.13 0.03 0.70 0.14 0.13 0.03
80+ 0.75 0.13 0.10 0.02 0.95 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.85 0.08 0.06 0.01
15+ 0.34 0.19 0.39 0.07 0.60 0.13 0.24 0.04 0.47 0.16 0.32 0.06
25+ 0.41 0.18 0.32 0.09 0.70 0.10 0.15 0.04 0.55 0.14 0.24 0.07
2010 15‐19 0.19 0.23 0.58 0.00 0.31 0.19 0.51 0.00 0.25 0.21 0.54 0.00
20‐24 0.22 0.15 0.55 0.07 0.22 0.15 0.55 0.07 0.22 0.15 0.55 0.07
25‐29 0.25 0.17 0.48 0.11 0.25 0.17 0.48 0.11 0.25 0.17 0.48 0.11
30‐34 0.27 0.19 0.41 0.14 0.27 0.19 0.41 0.14 0.27 0.19 0.41 0.14
35‐39 0.31 0.19 0.37 0.13 0.31 0.19 0.37 0.13 0.31 0.19 0.37 0.13
40‐44 0.36 0.18 0.34 0.12 0.36 0.18 0.34 0.12 0.36 0.18 0.34 0.12
45‐49 0.41 0.18 0.31 0.09 0.41 0.18 0.31 0.09 0.41 0.18 0.31 0.09
50‐54 0.45 0.17 0.30 0.09 0.45 0.17 0.30 0.09 0.45 0.17 0.30 0.09
55‐59 0.44 0.19 0.28 0.08 0.44 0.19 0.28 0.08 0.44 0.19 0.28 0.08
60‐64 0.51 0.18 0.24 0.07 0.51 0.18 0.24 0.07 0.51 0.18 0.24 0.07
65‐69 0.53 0.18 0.22 0.07 0.53 0.18 0.22 0.07 0.53 0.18 0.22 0.07
70‐74 0.59 0.15 0.20 0.06 0.59 0.15 0.20 0.06 0.59 0.15 0.20 0.06
75‐79 0.66 0.15 0.15 0.04 0.66 0.15 0.15 0.04 0.66 0.15 0.15 0.04
80+ 0.71 0.14 0.12 0.03 0.93 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.83 0.08 0.07 0.02
15+ 0.31 0.18 0.42 0.08 0.54 0.14 0.28 0.05 0.42 0.16 0.35 0.07
25+ 0.36 0.18 0.35 0.10 0.64 0.12 0.19 0.05 0.50 0.15 0.27 0.08
2015 15‐19 0.16 0.20 0.63 0.00 0.25 0.17 0.57 0.00 0.21 0.19 0.60 0.00
20‐24 0.19 0.14 0.59 0.08 0.19 0.14 0.59 0.08 0.19 0.14 0.59 0.08
25‐29 0.22 0.15 0.51 0.12 0.22 0.15 0.51 0.12 0.22 0.15 0.51 0.12
30‐34 0.25 0.17 0.44 0.15 0.25 0.17 0.44 0.15 0.25 0.17 0.44 0.15
35‐39 0.27 0.19 0.41 0.14 0.27 0.19 0.41 0.14 0.27 0.19 0.41 0.14
40‐44 0.31 0.19 0.37 0.13 0.31 0.19 0.37 0.13 0.31 0.19 0.37 0.13
45‐49 0.36 0.18 0.34 0.12 0.36 0.18 0.34 0.12 0.36 0.18 0.34 0.12
50‐54 0.41 0.18 0.31 0.09 0.41 0.18 0.31 0.09 0.41 0.18 0.31 0.09
55‐59 0.44 0.17 0.30 0.09 0.44 0.17 0.30 0.09 0.44 0.17 0.30 0.09
60‐64 0.44 0.19 0.29 0.08 0.44 0.19 0.29 0.08 0.44 0.19 0.29 0.08
65‐69 0.50 0.18 0.25 0.07 0.50 0.18 0.25 0.07 0.50 0.18 0.25 0.07
70‐74 0.52 0.18 0.23 0.08 0.52 0.18 0.23 0.08 0.52 0.18 0.23 0.08
75‐79 0.58 0.15 0.20 0.06 0.58 0.15 0.20 0.06 0.58 0.15 0.20 0.06
80+ 0.67 0.15 0.15 0.04 0.91 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.79 0.09 0.09 0.02
15+ 0.28 0.17 0.45 0.09 0.49 0.14 0.31 0.06 0.38 0.16 0.39 0.08
25+ 0.33 0.17 0.39 0.12 0.58 0.13 0.23 0.06 0.45 0.15 0.31 0.09
2020 15‐19 0.14 0.17 0.69 0.00 0.21 0.15 0.64 0.00 0.17 0.16 0.66 0.00
20‐24 0.16 0.13 0.62 0.09 0.16 0.13 0.62 0.09 0.16 0.13 0.62 0.09
25‐29 0.19 0.14 0.54 0.13 0.19 0.14 0.54 0.13 0.19 0.14 0.54 0.13
30‐34 0.22 0.15 0.47 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.47 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.47 0.16
35‐39 0.25 0.16 0.44 0.15 0.25 0.16 0.44 0.15 0.25 0.16 0.44 0.15
40‐44 0.27 0.19 0.41 0.14 0.27 0.19 0.41 0.14 0.27 0.19 0.41 0.14
45‐49 0.31 0.19 0.37 0.13 0.31 0.19 0.37 0.13 0.31 0.19 0.37 0.13
50‐54 0.36 0.18 0.34 0.12 0.36 0.18 0.34 0.12 0.36 0.18 0.34 0.12
55‐59 0.41 0.18 0.31 0.09 0.41 0.18 0.31 0.09 0.41 0.18 0.31 0.09
60‐64 0.44 0.17 0.30 0.09 0.44 0.17 0.30 0.09 0.44 0.17 0.30 0.09
65‐69 0.43 0.19 0.29 0.08 0.43 0.19 0.29 0.08 0.43 0.19 0.29 0.08
70‐74 0.49 0.18 0.25 0.08 0.49 0.18 0.25 0.08 0.49 0.18 0.25 0.08
75‐79 0.50 0.18 0.23 0.08 0.50 0.18 0.23 0.08 0.50 0.18 0.23 0.08
80+ 0.60 0.15 0.19 0.06 0.90 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.76 0.09 0.12 0.03
15+ 0.26 0.16 0.48 0.11 0.44 0.14 0.35 0.07 0.35 0.15 0.41 0.09
25+ 0.29 0.17 0.41 0.13 0.52 0.14 0.27 0.08 0.40 0.15 0.34 0.10
2025 15‐19 0.12 0.14 0.74 0.00 0.17 0.13 0.70 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.72 0.00
20‐24 0.14 0.12 0.65 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.65 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.65 0.09
25‐29 0.16 0.13 0.56 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.56 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.56 0.14
30‐34 0.19 0.14 0.50 0.17 0.19 0.14 0.50 0.17 0.19 0.14 0.50 0.17
35‐39 0.22 0.15 0.47 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.47 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.47 0.16
40‐44 0.25 0.16 0.44 0.15 0.25 0.16 0.44 0.15 0.25 0.16 0.44 0.15
45‐49 0.27 0.19 0.41 0.14 0.27 0.19 0.41 0.14 0.27 0.19 0.41 0.14
50‐54 0.31 0.19 0.37 0.13 0.31 0.19 0.37 0.13 0.31 0.19 0.37 0.13
55‐59 0.36 0.18 0.34 0.12 0.36 0.18 0.34 0.12 0.36 0.18 0.34 0.12
60‐64 0.40 0.18 0.32 0.10 0.40 0.18 0.32 0.10 0.40 0.18 0.32 0.10
65‐69 0.43 0.17 0.31 0.09 0.43 0.17 0.31 0.09 0.43 0.17 0.31 0.09
70‐74 0.42 0.19 0.30 0.09 0.42 0.19 0.30 0.09 0.42 0.19 0.30 0.09
75‐79 0.48 0.18 0.26 0.08 0.48 0.18 0.26 0.08 0.48 0.18 0.26 0.08
80+ 0.53 0.17 0.22 0.08 0.87 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.71 0.11 0.14 0.05
15+ 0.23 0.15 0.50 0.12 0.40 0.14 0.38 0.08 0.31 0.15 0.44 0.10
25+ 0.26 0.16 0.44 0.14 0.46 0.14 0.31 0.09 0.36 0.15 0.38 0.11  
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Proportion of people by education, age and sex in Pakistan ‐ Global Education Trend Scenario
Male Female Both Sexes
Age Group noedu prim sec ter noedu prim sec ter noedu prim sec ter
2030 15‐19 0.10 0.10 0.80 0.00 0.13 0.11 0.76 0.00 0.12 0.11 0.78 0.00
20‐24 0.12 0.11 0.67 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.67 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.67 0.10
25‐29 0.14 0.12 0.59 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.59 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.59 0.15
30‐34 0.16 0.13 0.52 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.52 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.52 0.18
35‐39 0.19 0.14 0.50 0.17 0.19 0.14 0.50 0.17 0.19 0.14 0.50 0.17
40‐44 0.22 0.15 0.47 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.47 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.47 0.16
45‐49 0.25 0.16 0.44 0.15 0.25 0.16 0.44 0.15 0.25 0.16 0.44 0.15
50‐54 0.26 0.19 0.41 0.14 0.26 0.19 0.41 0.14 0.26 0.19 0.41 0.14
55‐59 0.31 0.19 0.37 0.13 0.31 0.19 0.37 0.13 0.31 0.19 0.37 0.13
60‐64 0.35 0.18 0.34 0.12 0.35 0.18 0.34 0.12 0.35 0.18 0.34 0.12
65‐69 0.39 0.18 0.32 0.10 0.39 0.18 0.32 0.10 0.39 0.18 0.32 0.10
70‐74 0.42 0.17 0.32 0.10 0.42 0.17 0.32 0.10 0.42 0.17 0.32 0.10
75‐79 0.41 0.19 0.31 0.10 0.41 0.19 0.31 0.10 0.41 0.19 0.31 0.10
80+ 0.48 0.17 0.26 0.09 0.83 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.66 0.11 0.17 0.05
15+ 0.21 0.14 0.52 0.12 0.35 0.13 0.42 0.09 0.28 0.14 0.47 0.11
25+ 0.24 0.16 0.46 0.15 0.42 0.14 0.34 0.10 0.33 0.15 0.40 0.12
2035 15‐19 0.09 0.09 0.82 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.80 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.81 0.00
20‐24 0.10 0.10 0.69 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.69 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.69 0.10
25‐29 0.12 0.11 0.61 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.61 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.61 0.16
30‐34 0.14 0.12 0.54 0.20 0.14 0.12 0.54 0.20 0.14 0.12 0.54 0.20
35‐39 0.16 0.13 0.52 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.52 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.52 0.18
40‐44 0.19 0.14 0.50 0.17 0.19 0.14 0.50 0.17 0.19 0.14 0.50 0.17
45‐49 0.22 0.15 0.47 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.47 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.47 0.16
50‐54 0.24 0.16 0.44 0.15 0.24 0.16 0.44 0.15 0.24 0.16 0.44 0.15
55‐59 0.26 0.19 0.41 0.14 0.26 0.19 0.41 0.14 0.26 0.19 0.41 0.14
60‐64 0.30 0.19 0.38 0.13 0.30 0.19 0.38 0.13 0.30 0.19 0.38 0.13
65‐69 0.34 0.18 0.35 0.13 0.34 0.18 0.35 0.13 0.34 0.18 0.35 0.13
70‐74 0.38 0.18 0.33 0.11 0.38 0.18 0.33 0.11 0.38 0.18 0.33 0.11
75‐79 0.41 0.16 0.32 0.10 0.41 0.16 0.32 0.10 0.41 0.16 0.32 0.10
80+ 0.42 0.18 0.30 0.10 0.78 0.08 0.11 0.03 0.60 0.13 0.20 0.07
15+ 0.19 0.14 0.54 0.13 0.31 0.13 0.45 0.11 0.25 0.13 0.50 0.12
25+ 0.21 0.15 0.48 0.16 0.37 0.14 0.38 0.11 0.29 0.14 0.43 0.14
2040 15‐19 0.07 0.08 0.85 0.00 0.08 0.09 0.83 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.84 0.00
20‐24 0.09 0.09 0.71 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.71 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.71 0.11
25‐29 0.10 0.10 0.63 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.63 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.63 0.17
30‐34 0.12 0.11 0.56 0.21 0.12 0.11 0.56 0.21 0.12 0.11 0.56 0.21
35‐39 0.14 0.12 0.54 0.20 0.14 0.12 0.54 0.20 0.14 0.12 0.54 0.20
40‐44 0.16 0.13 0.52 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.52 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.52 0.18
45‐49 0.19 0.14 0.50 0.17 0.19 0.14 0.50 0.17 0.19 0.14 0.50 0.17
50‐54 0.21 0.15 0.47 0.16 0.21 0.15 0.47 0.16 0.21 0.15 0.47 0.16
55‐59 0.24 0.16 0.44 0.15 0.24 0.16 0.44 0.15 0.24 0.16 0.44 0.15
60‐64 0.26 0.19 0.41 0.14 0.26 0.19 0.41 0.14 0.26 0.19 0.41 0.14
65‐69 0.29 0.19 0.38 0.14 0.29 0.19 0.38 0.14 0.29 0.19 0.38 0.14
70‐74 0.33 0.18 0.36 0.13 0.33 0.18 0.36 0.13 0.33 0.18 0.36 0.13
75‐79 0.37 0.18 0.34 0.11 0.37 0.18 0.34 0.11 0.37 0.18 0.34 0.11
80+ 0.40 0.17 0.32 0.11 0.75 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.58 0.13 0.22 0.08
15+ 0.17 0.13 0.56 0.15 0.27 0.13 0.47 0.12 0.22 0.13 0.52 0.13
25+ 0.19 0.14 0.50 0.17 0.33 0.14 0.41 0.13 0.26 0.14 0.46 0.15
2045 15‐19 0.06 0.08 0.87 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.86 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.87 0.00
20‐24 0.07 0.08 0.73 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.73 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.73 0.12
25‐29 0.08 0.09 0.64 0.18 0.08 0.09 0.64 0.18 0.08 0.09 0.64 0.18
30‐34 0.10 0.10 0.57 0.23 0.10 0.10 0.57 0.23 0.10 0.10 0.57 0.23
35‐39 0.12 0.11 0.56 0.21 0.12 0.11 0.56 0.21 0.12 0.11 0.56 0.21
40‐44 0.14 0.12 0.54 0.20 0.14 0.12 0.54 0.20 0.14 0.12 0.54 0.20
45‐49 0.16 0.13 0.52 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.52 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.52 0.18
50‐54 0.19 0.14 0.50 0.17 0.19 0.14 0.50 0.17 0.19 0.14 0.50 0.17
55‐59 0.21 0.15 0.47 0.16 0.21 0.15 0.47 0.16 0.21 0.15 0.47 0.16
60‐64 0.24 0.16 0.45 0.15 0.24 0.16 0.45 0.15 0.24 0.16 0.45 0.15
65‐69 0.25 0.18 0.42 0.15 0.25 0.18 0.42 0.15 0.25 0.18 0.42 0.15
70‐74 0.29 0.18 0.39 0.14 0.29 0.18 0.39 0.14 0.29 0.18 0.39 0.14
75‐79 0.32 0.17 0.36 0.14 0.32 0.17 0.36 0.14 0.32 0.17 0.36 0.14
80+ 0.37 0.17 0.34 0.12 0.69 0.11 0.16 0.05 0.54 0.14 0.25 0.08
15+ 0.15 0.12 0.57 0.16 0.24 0.12 0.50 0.14 0.19 0.12 0.54 0.15
25+ 0.17 0.13 0.52 0.18 0.28 0.13 0.44 0.14 0.23 0.13 0.48 0.16
2050 15‐19 0.05 0.07 0.89 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.89 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.89 0.00
20‐24 0.06 0.08 0.74 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.74 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.74 0.13
25‐29 0.07 0.08 0.65 0.19 0.07 0.08 0.65 0.19 0.07 0.08 0.65 0.19
30‐34 0.08 0.09 0.58 0.24 0.08 0.09 0.58 0.24 0.08 0.09 0.58 0.24
35‐39 0.10 0.10 0.57 0.23 0.10 0.10 0.57 0.23 0.10 0.10 0.57 0.23
40‐44 0.12 0.11 0.56 0.21 0.12 0.11 0.56 0.21 0.12 0.11 0.56 0.21
45‐49 0.14 0.12 0.54 0.20 0.14 0.12 0.54 0.20 0.14 0.12 0.54 0.20
50‐54 0.16 0.13 0.52 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.52 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.52 0.19
55‐59 0.18 0.14 0.50 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.50 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.50 0.17
60‐64 0.21 0.15 0.48 0.17 0.21 0.15 0.48 0.17 0.21 0.15 0.48 0.17
65‐69 0.23 0.16 0.45 0.16 0.23 0.16 0.45 0.16 0.23 0.16 0.45 0.16
70‐74 0.24 0.18 0.42 0.15 0.24 0.18 0.42 0.15 0.24 0.18 0.42 0.15
75‐79 0.27 0.18 0.40 0.15 0.27 0.18 0.40 0.15 0.27 0.18 0.40 0.15
80+ 0.33 0.17 0.36 0.14 0.65 0.12 0.18 0.06 0.50 0.14 0.26 0.10
15+ 0.13 0.11 0.59 0.17 0.21 0.12 0.52 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.55 0.16
25+ 0.15 0.12 0.53 0.19 0.25 0.13 0.47 0.16 0.20 0.13 0.50 0.18  
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From projection results such as the above, various derived measures can be 
computed and compared across scenarios or countries. For comparison of time series, 
parts of the full age- and sex-specific profile of particular interest will normally be 
selected. Figures 4-6 illustrate this for the TFR and the secondary attainment of the 
important group of women aged 20-39. The comparison of the latter measured across 
scenarios in Pakistan shows the tremendous potential impact that educational expansion 
trends have on the education levels of future generations of mothers, and may serve as 
an input into estimates of future levels of child mortality and the level of literacy that 
future school children may be expected to be exposed to at home. The GET and FT 
scenarios are quite close, indicating that in order to meet fairly ambitious targets, 
Pakistan would only need to follow a trajectory of expansion on secondary participation 
that has many historical precedents and can therefore be considered feasible. At the 
same time, the negative trend of the CEN scenario indicates that such a positive 
development is far from automatic and requires considerable effort in terms of absolute 
expansion. Because of high population growth and momentum, constant school capacity 
would imply no improvement during 2000-2050, falling far short of what is achievable 
under the GET scenario. Figure 6 places the Pakistani projection under the GET 
scenario in the context of a number of other new IIASA member countries. Reflecting 
their similar starting position, India and Pakistan share a similar projected trajectory. A 
second group is formed by Chile, China and South Africa, all of which may reach near 
universal secondary attainment among women aged 20-39 by the end of the projection 
period. 
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Figure 4.  Total Fertility Rate in Pakistan for four educational scenarios, 2000-2050. 
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Figure 5.  Proportion of Pakistani women with at least a secondary education aged 20-
39 for four education scenarios, 2000-2050. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Proportion of women with at least a secondary education aged 20-39 for the 
global education trend scenario, selected countries, 2000-2050. 
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Discussion 
The development of China and India, the two largest populations by far, is shown in 
Figures 7 and 8. Both are set for substantial progress in human capital development: 
China predominantly in terms of the composition of its working-age population; India in 
terms of the number of highly-qualified people added to the potential labor force. 
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Figure 7.  The population of China aged 20-64 by education level, 1970-2050. 
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Figure 8.  The population of India aged 20-64 by education level, 1970-2050. 
 
The warning that the projections for individual countries are not predictions, but 
merely demonstrate the consequences of certain assumptions, is well illustrated by the 
case of Zimbabwe. Based on the situation in the year 2000, purely in terms of the 
demographic dynamics and even very average educational expansion (i.e., following the 
GET scenario), Zimbabwe’s human capital prospects are quite promising. In 2050, the 
population aged 15-64 could be overwhelmingly educated to at least the secondary 
level, with the proportion of tertiary education running twice as high at almost 20 
percent than the proportion of those failing to complete primary at less than 10 percent 
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(see Figure 9). However, given the known development crisis in Zimbabwe during the 
last decade, such a scenario seems extremely optimistic. Nevertheless it serves a useful 
purpose: When assessing the actual situation in 2015 or later, it gives an indication of 
how much progress potential that could otherwise have reasonably been expected was 
lost to the crisis and wasted. In fact, considering only the modeled dynamics, Zimbabwe 
had the potential for one of the most dramatic improvements in human capital between 
2000 and 2050. 
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Figure 9.  The proportion aged 20-64 by education level, Zimbabwe, 1970-2050. 
 
At the level of attainment transitions in the young cohorts, ‘overtaking’ is not 
possible in the GET scenario, because all countries are assumed to progress along the 
same curve of how the attainment of consecutive cohorts improves year after year. 
Note, however, that at the population level, overtaking is indeed possible. This is 
because, depending on the rate of population growth, it takes different amounts of time 
in different countries before changes in the education of the young are reflected in the 
education profile of the population as a whole. Population attainment reacts only slowly 
to changes in enrollment patterns, which only affect the education profile of new 
cohorts reaching working age, not that of older cohorts. If population growth is high, 
young cohorts are large compared to their parent’s generation, and the population’s 
education profile is dominated by the recent schooling experience. Conversely, if 
population growth is low or negative, the average education level in the population is 
dominated by the education levels prevalent among the older cohorts, and only when 
these are replaced does the population profile fully reflect improvements in schooling. 
In addition to the rate of population growth, the time to convergence is also determined 
by how rapidly the schooling of consecutive cohorts is changing. While the former 
determines the rate at which the population profile changes, the amount of change in 
cohort attainment determines by how much the population profile will change 
eventually. These effects can be observed in the results of the constant enrollment ratio 
scenario. In the case of Thailand (Figure 10), if enrollment rates remained constant at 
their year 2000 levels, it would take 40 years for the population profile to converge to a 
state that reflects these rates. Other countries exhibiting such a behavior as a result of 
slowing population growth include Egypt, Morocco, China, Indonesia and Malaysia. 
 34
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Pr
o
po
rt
io
n
Years
Thailand - Proportion Aged 20-64 by Level of Educational Attainment in  
1970-2050 - Constant Enrollment Ratio (CER) Scenario
No Education Primary Secondary Tertiary
 
Figure 10.  The proportion aged 20-64 by education level, Thailand, 1970-2050. 
 
By contrast, despite rapid change in the years leading up to 2000, if enrollment 
rates in the Comoros remained constant after that point, the population attainment 
profile would reflect these rates more rapidly, within 20 years (see Figure 11). 
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Figure 11.  The proportion aged 20-64 by education level, Comoros, 1970-2050. 
 
In this context, it becomes evident that raising enrollment prior to a decline in 
fertility (and, by implication, a leveling off or even decline in cohort size) shortens the 
time it takes for the attainment profile of the population as a whole to be significantly 
improved. At the same time, it is clear that it is precisely after fertility has begun to 
decline that improvements in enrollment are easiest to achieve, because less (or even 
no) absolute expansion may be required. Countries that may be expected to make the 
first effect work in their favor can be found across Africa, Asia and Latin America, 
including Eritrea, Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia, Nepal, Pakistan, Cambodia, 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Nicaragua. As Figure 12 illustrates for the example of Chad, 
tremendous population growth may be expected until 2050, but nearly all of this growth 
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could occur in the secondary and higher categories, giving such countries the 
opportunity to add huge numbers of highly-qualified people to their working-age 
population. 
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Figure 12.  The population of Chad aged 20-64 by education level, 1970-2050. 
 
A different set of countries could benefit from the second effect. In these 
countries, even under the constant enrollment number scenario, substantial 
improvements would be possible because falling cohort sizes would allow greater 
participation rates to be achieved at constant capacity. This includes both industrialized 
countries such as the UK or Spain, transitional countries such as Croatia, Slovakia, 
Poland or the Czech Republic, and a number of developing countries such as Myanmar, 
Indonesia and Mauritius. Figure 13 illustrates the effect for Mauritius. 
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Figure 13.  The proportion aged 20-64 by education level, Mauritius, 1970-2050. 
 
An even greater impact on the different country patterns is the fact that countries 
differ dramatically in the time lag between the growth periods of different education 
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levels. In some countries, secondary education only became a mass phenomenon long 
after primary education or when the primary was already nearly universal. Elsewhere, 
the universalization of secondary schooling followed that of primary schooling much 
more quickly, and in some countries there were substantial proportions of tertiary-
educated while many others were still without any schooling. This difference is well 
illustrated by contrasting Belize and Haiti. By the time more than 20 percent of the 
working population were educated at the secondary level or higher in Belize in the 
1980s, primary schooling was already at 90 percent, having crossed 20 percent many 
decades before. By contrast, in Haiti in recent decades, secondary attainment in the 
working population has been crossing thresholds that primary attainment crossed a mere 
30 years earlier, and when secondary diffusion reached 20 percent, primary attainment 
was only about 40 percentage points ahead. An even more extreme example of the latter 
pattern is provided by the Maldives, where the diffusion of secondary schooling follows 
only about 10 years behind that of primary schooling (see Figures 14-16). 
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Figure 14.  The proportion aged 20-64 by education level, Belize, 1970-2050. 
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Figure 15.  The proportion aged 20-64 by education level, Haiti, 1970-2050. 
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Figure 16.  The proportion aged 20-64 by education level, Maldives, 1970-2050. 
 
With regard to the lag between tertiary and lower levels, examples for an 
extreme lag are provided by many Central Asian republics, especially Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, where the proportion of the tertiary-educated working-age population only 
exceeded 15 percent when secondary schooling was already almost universal. By 
contrast, this threshold was crossed by tertiary education in Portugal when less than half 
of the working population had secondary attainment. The implication for the projected 
human capital in 2050 is that in countries with big lags, only two categories will account 
for the vast majority of the population, because the non-educated have all but 
disappeared by the time tertiary gains any kind of significance, while in countries with 
short lags, three or even all four categories may still be substantially represented, as in 
Morocco (Figure 17). 
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Figure 17.  The population of Morocco aged 20-64 by education level, 1970-2050. 
 
A pattern that may be interpreted either as a warning to moderate expectations or 
as an argument for intensified effort – depending on the perspective – is provided by 
Ethiopia (see Figure 18), Mali, Niger or Burkina Faso. 
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Figure 18.  The population of Ethiopia aged 20-64 by education level, 1970-2050. 
 
The low starting position in 2000 implies that even under the assumption of 
reasonable progress (i.e., GET scenario), by 2050 nearly 40 percent of the working 
population in the case of Ethiopia, and 35 percent in the case of Burkina Faso, may be 
educated to less than primary level. It is noteworthy that by 2050, the average 
proportion of the “less than primary” category exceeds 10 percent only in ten countries, 
all but one in Africa. This means that if the above situation arises, these countries will 
have fallen hopelessly behind compared to the rest of the world. It should be noted, 
however, that some of the countries not included in the study due to non-availability of 
data are also likely to suffer equally bad or even worse prospects (such as Afghanistan 
or Sierra Leone, among others). Nevertheless there is a genuine threat that sub-Saharan 
Africa may remain the most problematic development region for another hundred years, 
if not longer. 
As a result of the lag in convergence discussed above, in the case of Ethiopia, 
even under the fast-track scenario that assumes the meeting of the EFA targets, as late 
as 2030, 20 percent of the working-age population would still be uneducated. This 
represents a substantial gain over the GET scenario. Another illustration of the 
difference a fast-track scenario could make to a country’s future is provided by Niger. 
Comparing the GET (Figure 19) and FT scenarios (Figure 20), it is evident that the 
socioeconomic outlook of the country in 2050 could be improved dramatically by the 
latter compared to the former. 
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Figure 19.  The population of Niger by age, sex and educational attainment in 2050, 
GET scenario. 
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Figure 20.  The population of Niger by age, sex and educational attainment in 2050, FT 
scenario. 
 
Even though Ethiopia and other countries may be set to fail in terms of suffering 
from a great number of uneducated adults at the end of the projection period, this 
reflects not a lack of projected progress, but the poor starting position. On the contrary, 
in terms of projected progress, Ethiopia may be regarded as one of the biggest 
improvers. A different way to conceive of ‘negative’ cases of human capital 
development would be to consider countries that are set to make little further progress in 
the coming decades. Excluding leading countries where further dramatic improvements 
are impossible (such as Denmark or New Zealand), this may apply to Tanzania, for 
instance. In Tanzania, the diffusion of primary education is already beginning to level 
off, while secondary attainment is still far from reaching the phase of rapid growth in 
the working population as a result of a particularly long lag (Figure 21). 
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Figure 21.  The proportion aged 20-64 by education level, Tanzania, 1970-2050. 
 
As a result, compared to countries that are about to enter a phase of rapid 
expansion of all three schooling levels in rapid succession, Tanzania’s projected 
progress between 2000 and 2050 under the GET scenario is relatively modest. Over 
time, how far ahead a country is at the primary level will matter less and less – as this 
level becomes near universal almost everywhere – and a country’s position on the 
growth trajectory of secondary and tertiary education will matter more and more. A 
country that was ahead in the race for primary expansion, but behind in the race for 
secondary, will see its position decline as the global focus shifts to higher levels. 
In terms of promising results, a long list of countries is about to enter or 
continue a steep trajectory of progress and undergo tremendous improvements in the 
educational attainment profile of their working population by 2050, whether purely by 
attainment proportions or numbers, even under the conservative assumption of 
expansion patterns similar to those of the past (i.e., under the GET scenario). For some, 
this means the virtual elimination of the unschooled category; for others it means great 
expansion at secondary and higher levels. It should be noted that the list is not limited to 
developing countries. As Figure 22 shows, even Portugal could significantly improve 
the attainment levels of its working population by 2050. 
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Figure 22.  The population of Portugal aged 20-64 by education level, 1970-2050. 
 
A number of regional patterns deserve further comment. In southern and 
southeastern Asia, numerous countries are set to undergo dramatic improvements in 
human capital, in particular Bangladesh, Nepal, Thailand and the Philippines, but also 
Myanmar, Lao PDR and India. Figure 23 shows the dramatic improvement projected for 
Nepal. 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Pr
o
po
rt
io
n
Years
Nepal - Proportion Aged 20-64 by Level of Educational Attainment in  
1970-2050 - Global Education Trend (GET) Scenario
No Education Primary Secondary Tertiary
 
Figure 23.  The proportion aged 20-64 by education level, Nepal, 1970-2050. 
 
Substantial improvements would occur under the GET scenario across sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), but as noted above, this region also contains many of the 
countries with the poorest prospects. By contrast, the Latin American region as a whole 
is poised to undergo a veritable universal human capital revolution by 2050. For a 
number of countries across the region, population dynamics and attainment trajectories 
near the steepest phase of progress combine to create opportunities for spectacular 
improvements, especially in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, El Salvador, Panama, 
Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay. As a whole, the region has the opportunity to almost catch up 
with Europe in terms of the population’s attainment profile (see Figures 24 and 25). 
 42
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Pr
o
po
rt
io
n
Years
El Salvador - Proportion Aged 20-64 by Level of Educational Attainment 
in  1970-2050 - Global Education Trend (GET) Scenario
No Education Primary Secondary Tertiary
 
Figure 24.  The proportion aged 20-64 by education level, El Salvador, 1970-2050. 
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Figure 25.  The proportion aged 20-64 by education level, Bolivia, 1970-2050. 
Future Refinements 
This paper represents the first release of the projection data, intended to make the first-
version results available to interested researchers as early as possible. A number of 
further modifications are planned. Some of these will not change the results, but will 
serve to validate them or assess their sensitivity to assumptions. Others will add further 
scenarios and countries to the database. Finally, the projection methodology itself is 
undergoing refinement and will lead to an eventual update of the present projections 
with an improved version. 
With respect to sensitivity analysis, the model assumptions with the weakest 
empirical support will require the most careful analysis. This includes the parametric 
specification of ESASFRs, as well as the assumed educational mortality differentials 
and migration behavior. Alternative specifications and parameter perturbations will be 
run and the results compared to those of the present model. Large discrepancies would 
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indicate the issue in question as an important area of further methodological work 
and/or flag the need for better empirical input data. 
Several validation exercises are possible. One is to compare the results of this 
broad based, global model with the projections resulting from more in-depth, country-
specific modeling exercises. Another concerns the coherence of assumptions in the 
back-projection and forward-projection exercises. It may be instructive to back-project 
the population distribution by age, sex and education in the year 2000 from the 
projected 2050 data and compare this to the actual empirical baseline. 
In subsequent releases, the projection is planned to offer greater coverage. 
Further countries are being added as more baseline data is obtained. In addition to 
alternative education scenarios, several demographic scenarios, with different stipulated 
trajectories for fertility and mortality levels, will be examined. As indicated in the 
discussion of the results above, the interaction of fertility and educational expansion 
with regard to their effect on human capital development are non-trivial. Alternative 
fertility scenarios will allow these effects to be disentangled further. Another extension 
concerns additional sources of heterogeneity. Human capital is commonly defined to 
include not only the skills and qualifications of a population, but also its health status. 
Accordingly, adding a robust disaggregation by health to the projections is a priority. 
Finally, a number of methodological refinements are being investigated, that 
would lead to a revision of the existing results in subsequent releases. One such 
refinement has already been mentioned, namely the possibility of fitting country-
specific school expansion parameters. Another concerns the estimation of the ESASFR, 
which in future releases will rely less on assumptions and be more data-driven. New 
datasets on international migration between specific sending and receiving countries 
may also be exploited. 
Conclusions and Outlook 
This paper gives an overview of the demographic projection method that was used to 
estimate a new comprehensive and detailed dataset on human capital by age and sex for 
the years 2000-2050. But beyond the interest in education per se, this new dataset 
facilitates the analysis of a great range of issues that education is assumed to influence 
positively. Health and survival are strongly linked with better education. Fertility levels 
tend to vary greatly with the level of education, and even such difficult to measure 
aspects of our quality of life at the societal level, the quality of institutions, the rule of 
law and democratic participation, are presumably facilitated by the fact that large 
segments of the population are well educated enough to exert the checks and balances 
that are necessary to establish or maintain a democracy and improve governance. For 
these qualities, good education of large parts of the population and not just small elites 
is probably a necessity, but not a sufficient condition. 
Using this new dataset, projections can be produced of how these other 
development dimensions may be expected to develop until 2050 in various countries, 
based on their edu-demographic profile. This may provide insights into which countries 
or regions may be expected to enter phases of turmoil. 
Based on the new model of the human capital contribution to economic growth 
estimated from the reconstruction dataset, education-sensitive projections of future 
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economic growth can be produced for a large number of countries that potentially differ 
dramatically from those based on an extrapolation of historic time-series data. A 
historical example is provided by South Korea. In the 1960s, based on historical growth 
data, the economic outlook would have been modest, but projections of its future human 
capital profile may have indicated that it was about to enter a window of opportunity 
combining high qualifications with low dependency ratios. 
It may also become possible to contribute to debates surrounding the future 
sustainability of public pension systems by providing estimates of expected productivity 
increases resulting from the changing qualification profile of the future workforce. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix Table 1.  Total Fertility Rates (other than the UN estimate) used in the 
projection of population in the global education trend scenario. 
 
Country 2000-2005 2045-2050 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2020 2020-2025 2025-2030 2030-2035 2035-2040 2040-2045 2045-2050
China Own Estimate Own Estimate 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50
China, Hong Kong SAR UN 2007 Own Estimate 0.94 0.98 1.02 1.06 1.10 1.14 1.18 1.22 1.26 1.30
China, Macao SAR UN 2007 Own Estimate 0.84 0.89 0.94 0.99 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20 1.25 1.30
Japan UN 2007 Own Estimate 1.29 1.31 1.34 1.36 1.38 1.41 1.43 1.45 1.48 1.50
Republic of Korea UN 2007 Own Estimate 1.24 1.27 1.30 1.33 1.36 1.39 1.41 1.44 1.47 1.50
Singapore UN 2007 Own Estimate 1.35 1.37 1.38 1.40 1.42 1.43 1.45 1.47 1.48 1.50
Thailand Own Estimate Own Estimate 1.60 1.59 1.58 1.57 1.56 1.54 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.50
Turkey UN 2007 Scherbov et al. 2008 2.23 2.18 2.18 2.18 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19
Bulgaria UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.26 1.38 1.40 1.41 1.43 1.45 1.46 1.48 1.50 1.51
Czech Republic UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.18 1.33 1.35 1.37 1.39 1.40 1.42 1.44 1.46 1.48
Hungary UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.30 1.35 1.36 1.38 1.40 1.41 1.43 1.45 1.47 1.48
Poland UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.25 1.27 1.29 1.31 1.33 1.35 1.37 1.39 1.41 1.43
Romania UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.29 1.32 1.34 1.36 1.38 1.39 1.41 1.43 1.45 1.47
Russian Federation UN 2007 Scherbov et al. 2008 1.30 1.30 1.35 1.40 1.44 1.49 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.52
Slovakia UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.22 1.25 1.26 1.29 1.31 1.33 1.35 1.37 1.39 1.41
Ukraine UN 2007 Scherbov et al. 2008 1.15 1.31 1.33 1.36 1.39 1.41 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.43
Denmark UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.76 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85
Estonia UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.39 1.55 1.56 1.57 1.58 1.59 1.60 1.61 1.62 1.63
Finland UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.75 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84
Ireland UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.97 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89
Latvia UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.25 1.36 1.37 1.39 1.40 1.42 1.44 1.46 1.47 1.49
Lithuania UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.28 1.35 1.36 1.38 1.40 1.42 1.44 1.46 1.48 1.49
Norway UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.80 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89
Sweden UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.67 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85
United Kingdom UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.70 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84
Croatia UN 2007 Scherbov et al. 2008 1.35 1.39 1.44 1.48 1.53 1.58 1.61 1.61 1.61 1.61
Greece UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.28 1.41 1.42 1.44 1.45 1.47 1.48 1.50 1.51 1.53
Italy UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.29 1.38 1.40 1.41 1.43 1.45 1.46 1.48 1.50 1.51
Malta UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.46 1.38 1.40 1.41 1.43 1.45 1.46 1.48 1.49 1.51
Portugal UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.45 1.36 1.38 1.39 1.41 1.43 1.44 1.46 1.48 1.50
Slovenia UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.23 1.32 1.34 1.36 1.37 1.39 1.41 1.43 1.45 1.47
Spain UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.29 1.39 1.40 1.42 1.43 1.45 1.46 1.48 1.50 1.51
TFYR Macedonia UN 2007 Scherbov et al. 2008 1.56 1.48 1.57 1.65 1.74 1.82 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.88
Austria UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.38 1.41 1.42 1.44 1.45 1.47 1.48 1.50 1.52 1.53
Belgium UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.64 1.75 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.77 1.77 1.77 1.78 1.78
France UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.88 1.98 1.98 1.97 1.97 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.95 1.95
Germany UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.35 1.34 1.35 1.37 1.39 1.41 1.42 1.44 1.46 1.48
Luxembourg UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.67 1.65 1.66 1.66 1.67 1.68 1.68 1.69 1.70 1.71
Netherlands UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.73 1.72 1.72 1.73 1.73 1.74 1.74 1.75 1.75 1.76
Switzerland UN 2007 Eurostat 2006 1.42 1.44 1.45 1.47 1.48 1.50 1.51 1.53 1.54 1.55
Canada UN 2007 Own Estimate 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.70
United States of America UN 2007 Own Estimate 2.04 2.04 2.04 2.04 2.04 2.04 2.04 2.04 2.04 1.90
Australia UN 2007 Own Estimate 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.90
New Zealand UN 2007 Own Estimate 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.90
Source
 
